INSTITUTE OF WORLD ECONOMICS, RESEARCH CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC AND REGIONAL STUDIES, HUNGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES NO.7

"MIGRATION IN EURASIA. THE FIRST 25 YEARS OF THE POST-SOVIET ERA"

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BUDAPEST, 2016

The studies have been submitted and finalized by September 2016.

ISBN: 978-963-301-639-8
ISSN: 2063-9465

Cover design:
GÁBOR TÚRY

The cover is based on the photo “Trans-Siberian Railway”by Satbir Singh
(https://www.flickr.com/photos/satbir/221945630/)

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This volume was published by the generous support of the Hungarian Scientific Fund
in the framework of the project “Russia as political and economic centre in the
Eurasian space at the beginning of the 21st century – sphere of influence,
competitors and consequences for Europe and Hungary” (NFKI K-105914)

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MIGRATION IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE: AN INTRODUCTION

Twenty five years passed from December 8, 1991, when the Belovezhskii agreement on dissolution of USSR was signed by the representatives of Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia. The collapse of the socialist system was definitely a key event of the 20th century for Central and Eastern Europe. It was accompanied by the enthusiasm and high aspirations of unity after the fall of the iron curtain for the people across Europe. The expectations and hopes of a bright future mitigated the shock that occurred from economic transition and massive waves of displaced people. The 27 new sovereign states and at least five unrecognized territories that emerged after the collapse of the socialist system have specific relationships, both among themselves and with the EU. Some of the former socialist countries arranged the civilized divorce (like former republics of Czechoslovakia), the others, in opposite, fell into protracted bloody conflicts (as former republic Yugoslavia). Russia declared itself as the legal successor of the USSR and for the last 25 years tries to manage close relations with countries of the so called "near abroad"[1], by formation of different economic, political and security unions (like the CIS, the Russia-Belorussia union, the Eurasian union) for the accommodation by the fSU countries to the new realities of open market economy.

In the myriad of events and processes in the former Soviet Union since 1991, the significance of the human component, the migration and demography have been partly overlooked. This is especially true for economic analyses. Despite the fact, that the flow of labor and movement of people constitute one of the main variables of productivity and welfare, its role have been traditionally overshadowed in economic studies by other dimensions, like trade and capital movements. Thus in our research project *"Russia as political and economic centre in the Eurasian space at the beginning of the 21st century"* (NKFI-K105914) the study of migration processes in the post-Soviet space was chosen as one of the major novelties. We consciously strived for a better understanding of migration and its impact on the local labour markets, its implications on economic growth and development.

No doubt, migration and demography are vital components of the post-Soviet transformation. In spite of the disintegration processes, Russia is still a political, economic and cultural magnet for the fSU countries. The dissolution of the USSR in 1991 left

[1] The discourse used in fSU for the definition of fSU countries

about 25 million Russians and 4 million representatives of other titular nations of Russia outside Russia as foreigners in the newly formed countries.[2] Unsurprisingly, between 1991 and 2013 around 9.6 million persons resettled back to Russia from fSU countries. Russian citizenship was obtained by 8 million persons, 98 per cent of whom are from fSU.[3] Almost 1.5 million people got the refugee status in 1990s because of forced repatriation of Russian-speaking population. Currently, there are about 11.6 million labor migrants in Russia from fSU.[4]

The difference in the demographic processes between the fSU countries and Russia helps them in the formation of a compensatory labor market. The contrast between the ageing and rapidly declining populations of some Slavic countries, like Ukraine, Belorussia and Russia and the population boom in some Southern Republics, like Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan was a well-known social phenomenon of the 1970s. These trends have not stopped after 1991: the population of Uzbekistan has increased 1.5 times, by another 10 million people. This country now is a major supplier of labour migrants to Russia, while the proportion of pensioners in Russia grew from 222 to 283 per 1000 people by 2012.[5]

At the same time, the momentum of change, the newly developed political, economic and social patterns of post-Soviet transition have left a much bigger imprint on human relations. The abolishment of travel restrictions, the liberalization of movement sparked a major outflow of people to the developed countries. Unsurprisingly, newly emerging opportunities for free movement formed the new ethnic diasporas of migrants from former socialist countries in the Western countries. Among 215.8 million international migrants in the world in 2010 about 44.6 million people were from 29 countries of the former socialist block[6]). From 1991 to 2012 about 22 million people from former socialist countries resettled to the West.[7]

New borders, conflicts, changing socio-economic and cultural patterns represent another major drive for migration. Despite the large, often ethnically-determined migration of the 1990s, we cannot close this chapter unanimously. The conflict in Eastern Ukraine from 2014 to nowadays created about 1.2 million asylum seekers to Russia, and about 22 thousands in the EU. Almost 1.7 million persons are internally displaced in the Ukraine.[8] The potential hotspots in Central Asia and the Caucasus created new borders, and displaced people clearly demonstrate the ongoing and repeatedly incoming nature of these trends.

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[2] The Population of Russia 2000
[3] Chudinovski 2015
[4] World Bank 2015
[5] Russian Federal State Statistics Service
[6] Heleniak 2013; World Bank 2010
[7] IOM 2015
[8] Molodikova, Yudina 2016

In this project and by this publication we would like to give a relatively short overview of some major migration issues in the region. Understandably, we had to be very selective due to limitations of the projects. Nonetheless, we hope these papers outline the magnitude of issue and may improve the understanding the economic complexities of the post-Soviet region.

The articles in the proposed volume present the different aspects of migration patterns that exist in the post-Soviet space. *Irina Molodikova* in her article gives an overview of the development in political and institutional structure of relations between the Russian state and Russian diasporas abroad. The notion of "divided nation" is familiar to many CEE nations (i.e. the Hungarians and the Poles), but emerged as a discourse in Russian policy only after the dissolution of USSR. To understand the meaning of Russia's national and foreign policy towards the neighbouring fSU countries and compatriots is impossible without considering the relation of this policy to the historical situation of a state with imperial background. The emerging rhetoric about the 'divided' nation where the cultural (ethnic) 'body' of Russia was cut, and it is still much bigger than the political one, gives an explanation to the perceived justification of interference into the internal affairs of other fSU republics, trying to create a balance between these two bodies by developing the classical nationalistic ideology described by Gellner.[9]

However, it is difficult to define the concept of "compatriot" in Russian politics. It is rather vague because of the multi-ethnicity of (the former USSR and) Russia. The meaning of this term in legal documents has changed since the 1990s, including the definition of 2010 'all citizens of former Soviet Union and Russian Empire (even the indigenous population) and their descendants' that gives Russia the 'right to protect' the population of the former Soviet empire. In the last ten years the Russian government pays special attention to the compatriot policy, because of internal problems stemming from the demographic crisis and because of the desire to strengthen the economic and political influence of Russia among CIS countries. The definition of compatriots was expanded in order to assist in the implementation of Russia's ambitious plans for the creation of a new Eurasian Economic Area and security institutions as a counterbalance to EU and NATO. Russia presents itself at least as a regional power, trying to incorporate the population and economies of neighboring countries into its sphere of control using various instruments, including compatriots' policy. The foreign policy, in respect of compatriots, also works in this direction.

The article of *Galina Osadchaya* and *Tatiana Youdina* evaluates the development of migration legislation in general, its reflection on the migration flows and its relation to the creation of the new intergovernmental institution of Eurasian Union. The creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States in 1991 was a step towards civilized divorce. During the last 25 years we have witnessed the change of political orientation of many fSU countries. The Baltic states, immediately after the dissolution of the USSR

[9] Gellner 1991

took course on the Western values. Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia tried to follow the same direction more than ten years later. As a counterbalance to the EU, Russia has formed a similar institution: the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). When discussing Russian foreign policy toward the countries of 'near abroad', we should recall the fact that usually is forgotten by many researchers, but might also be important in understanding the migration policy of the Russian government after the dissolution of the USSR. The referendum on the future of the Soviet Union held on 17 March 1991 (before the dissolution of USSR) involved about 148.5 million people (or eighty per cent of eligible voters across the USSR). According to the referendum, 76.4 per cent of citizens were in favor of the *'preservation of the USSR as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics'*. Armenia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania and Moldova did not participate in this referendum, but people in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, the Transnistrian and Gagauzian parts of the Moldovan SSR voted almost unanimously for a renewed type of the Soviet Union.[10] Maybe not surprisingly, we can nowadays see as a consequence of that referendum the re-emergence of cooperation and new forms of unions like CIS, the Union State of Russia and Belarus, and finally the EAEU.

The treaty on creation of the Eurasian Economic Union (the EAEU), came into effect on January 1, 2015, and similarly to the European Union guarantees freedom of labor force movement for the population of Russia, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. EAEU should create favorable conditions for a common labor market and free labor movement. Free visa and labor regime, circulation of goods, social welfare protection, access to free education in any member-state should be the advantages of the EAEU. According to the article, Russia as the constant magnet of migrants from the fSU countries, has benefits from the creation of the new structure that helps the country to manage its demographic crisis. Nevertheless, the main sources of migration to Russia are the Central Asian republics. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan occupied the top two positions in the global ranking of countries by the percentage of remittance as per cent of GDP (41.7 and 30.3, respectively).[11]

The article written by *Olena Malinovska* is about the migration processes in Ukraine under the current situation of political crisis and protracted military conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Ukraine is one of the biggest countries of Europe and a source of legal and illegal labor migration to the EU and Russia. Its geographic location in-between two centers of economic attraction (the EU and Russia) created migration outflows in both directions. In the situation of economic crisis that has deteriorated since 2014 by the political crisis and military instability in the Eastern part of Ukraine, the main direction of migration became outward. While in the 1990s and early 2000s the main tendency was circular migration, the situation of economic and military conflicts push migrants to stay abroad forever. Outward migration is one of the main factors behind the shrinking of population in Ukraine. In 1993 the total population of the country reached 52.2

[10] Kommersant 2011
[11] World Bank 2015

million people, but outmigration combined with the natural decrease led to a dramatic drop of population of about 10 million people. This trend affects the economic development and becomes one of the major security threats for the country.

The association agreement signed by Ukraine with the EU in 2014 has opened up some new directions in the development of migration policy, especially with the expectations regarding the introduction of the free visa regime. The European Commission adopted the road map for Ukraine as the process of homogenization of its legislation in all spheres of life with the EU *acquis communautaire*. Unfortunately, the refugee crisis in the EU, the results of the Netherland referendum against the Association Agreement with Ukraine and the results of Brexit put Ukraine's westward direction under serious threat. The population of the country is split not only because of migration preferences, but on the political orientation about their country's future with the EU or Russia.

The article of *Vladimir Mukomel* argues that the immigration of people from Central Asia is not a choice, but a necessity for Russia. Labor in Russia becomes a deficit: drastic decrease of employable population creates a completely new situation on the Russian labor markets. Migrants are attracted to Russia by higher salaries, living standards, and the availability of jobs on he Russian labor market. Even during the current economic crisis, the unemployment rate in Russia is generally quite low and is very low in the regions that host the largest number of migrants.

The often illegal migration of cheap labour from fSU republics has a negative influence on Russian society. The discriminatory practices and social exclusion of migrants has becoming an important social problem that transcends the boundaries of the migration and the integration policies per se. Xenophobia pervades all layers of the Russian society. The influx of migrants has been perceived by many Russians as a violation of public order, as fragile and unstable as it may be. The confrontation occurs mostly within the socio-cultural sphere: Russians are convinced that migrant cultures dilute the cultural core of their communities. But the demographic crisis and the needs of economic development in Russia dictate the necessity of migrantion in major spheres of the economy, so integration policy should be developed and implemented.

The article of *Julianna Faludi* deals with the impact of dependency structures on migration within the region. The division of labor and resources across the fSU is deeply shaped by the heritage of dependency structures, rooting back to centuries of expansion of the Russian Empire, but also to the centrally planned allocation of production and factors of production inside the Soviet Union. The transition affected all countries of the area by generating a movement of people for citizenship, labor, trade, or peace. Those countries, whose economy relied on agriculture, or had a dependence on imported energy proved to be the most vulnerable ones. Countries that lacked natural resources or the potential to transform their economies to productive ones relied on their labor force as a survival strategy, creating often dependencies on remittances. Though remittances have had a positive effect on reducing poverty and addressing problems

stemming from economic instability, the long-term dependence of states on remittances created a non-sustainable path, missing incentives for structural reforms, and raising inequalities between countries as a consequence.

Summing up the main findings of the volume we can argue that in spite of the deep reforms in economic and political spheres, the transformation of the common space that for a long time united the former Soviet republics is at the starting point. All the fSU countries are involved in the global system of migration, but the legacy of the common historical past influences the population and elite behavior, and needs much more time for the real independence of the countries.

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IRINA MOLODIKOVA

COMPATRIOTS' POLICY IN MODERN RUSSIA: PECULIARITIES IN DEVELOPMENT OF "RUSSIAN WORLD"

1. Introduction

The armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine erupted with unexpected haste, shocking Europe and the population of both countries in various ways. How could this happen when the two countries shared a common history, cultural similarities and the highest level of intermarriages, participated in the same economic and political unions? Many times in human history the issue of compatriots has become a focus of discord between the country of origin of the diaspora and the country where the diaspora lives.

After the dissolution of the USSR, Russia developed a policy on compatriots for the 25 million people that were left abroad, a policy that has undergone considerable transformations in the last twenty five years. In the 1990s it was more reactive and influenced by the general political and economic situation of the country and of the region, by directions and types of migration flows and later, after the Millennium it became more pragmatic and droven by Russia's interests in preserving its influence over the former Soviet republics. This was done in various ways: from the political mechanisms on formation of various unions (like the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Eurasian Economic Union), through the creation of peculiar economic mechanisms (like gas deals with Belarus and Ukraine), to military intervention (like in South Ossetia). Russia has been the main host country for resettlement and labor migration for people from the fSU.

The paper discusses peculiarities of Compatriots policy and Russian Diasporas' relations with the Motherland and countries of residence mainly in the CIS region and evaluates the concerns regarding compatriots and the triggers of possible conflict.

2. Russian Diaspora – possible numbers and figures

The definition of the term "compatriot', which in the early 1990s was tantamount to 'Russianness', is difficult to interpret because the USSR and Russia are multiethnic states and high percentages of titular ethnic groups such as Tatars, Ossetians, Lizginians and Adhygs live outside Russia in other countries of the fSU and all overthe world. At the time of the fall of the Soviet Union, about 25 million ethnic Russians (or 17.4 % of all Russians) and about 4 millions of other titular ethnicities of Russia were living in the

various republics.[1] Russian was the state language of the USSR and *lingua franca* for all people of the Soviet Union. Unsurprisingly, after the collapse of the USSR, the 1990s were characterized by forced repatriation flows to Russia, with 81 % of returnees being ethnic Russians. In some countries Russian diasporas have shrunk by almost 30% (table 1). Between 1993 and 2013 about 9.6 million people from the fSU resettled in Russia and 8.6 million have already received Russian citizenship.[2]

One of the main contributing factors to the mass exodus of the ethnic Russian population after the collapse of USSR was the change in the status of the Russian language from the *lingua franca* to a minority language. In many newly independent fSU countries Russian language and culture were viewed by many indigenous ethnic groups as symbols of a traumatic past. The status of Russian language was to a significant extent related to the size of the Russian community in fSU republics and also to the relations between Russian and these countries. Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Belorussia, Latvia and Estonia had a high share of Russians within the population, what was perceived by some governments (especially in the Baltic States) as a threat to the sovereignty of those countries. Nevertheless in Kazakhstan due to the mass exodus of Russians in 1994, when the number of repatriates reached 477,000 per year, an amendment was introduced to the Kazakh Constitution to give Russian the status of official language. This decision led to a decline in the number of repatriates to 176,000 in 1996.[3] Russian has become an official language in Belarus and Kyrgyzstan. In Moldova and Tajikistan it is the language of interethnic communication, while in Uzbekistan and Armenia, it has the status of the language of a national minority.

Latvia and Estonia are specific cases, where Russians constitute about 30% of the total population (about half of them being born in those countries) and have no *de jure* status as a minority. In Latvia, most Russians have special status and *'non-citizen'* passports while in Estonia they are aliens with permanent residence permits.

The naturalization process in majority of the fSU countries (with the exception of Latvia and Estonia) gave all population that lived at the territory of these republics in time of dissolution status of citizenship regardless of their ethnic affiliation. In Latvia and Estonia it has been seriously hampered by requirements for language and constitution tests for the Russian-speaking population.

These strict policies on naturalization are frequently seen as a sort of punishment for the Baltic States' loss of independence in 1940 because of Soviet annexation. The non-citizen and stateless status of Russian-speaking minority in Latvia and Estonia respective, together with the respective Law on State Language, Education and Employment have imposed heavy restrictions on the political, social and economic rights of Russian

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[1] Mukomel & Pain 2000, p.247;, Heleniak 2013.
[2] Chudinovski 2014.
[3] Karachyrina 2013, p.136

minorities. The only real improvement was done by the liberalization of the way to naturalize the new-born children of stateless Russian persons in 2000s.

According to the Council of Compatriots, in Latvia in the 2010s, even in Russian ethnic schools, 60% of the curriculum is taught in the state language and only 40% in the minority language.[4] Russian schools exist in limited numbers and Baltic States governments are planning to close them by 2018.[5] In Latvia higher education also will only be permitted in the state language from the second year onwards.[6]

The largest Russian diaspora in the world lives in Ukraine (about 8 million Russians or 17.0% of the Ukrainian population according to the 2001 census). This figure, however, does not represent the actual numbers of the Ukrainian and Russian-speaking populations: for example, 5.6 million (14.8 %) Ukrainians declared Russian as their mother tongue and 0.3 million Russians (3.9 %) declared Ukrainian as their mother tongue. The Russian diaspora lives mainly in the Eastern and Southern parts of Ukraine and 57% were born in Ukraine.[7] Nevertheless, till 2007 Russian language had no status in Ukraine when it signed the European Charter on regional languages. The status of Russian as a minority language on numerous occasions has been a source of disagreement and cause for dispute in Ukrainian society, especially during elections.

There are vast differences in the language of communication at home between Western, Southern, Eastern and Central parts of Ukraine as well. While in the Western parts the majority of the population speaks Ukrainian, in the Southern and Eastern parts the main language till the beginning of Ukranian crisis in 2013 was Russian. A survey in 2002 on the opinion of families regarding the need to study Russian in schools (by regions) indicated that even in Western regions 52.6 % of the population agreed that it was necessary to learn Russian, with more than 82% of the population supporting this statement in Central, South and Eastern Ukraine.[8]

The lack of a clear definition of the status of the Russian language in fact gave the Ukrainian government the opportunity to act unilaterally, phasing Russian language and literature out of the curriculum in state-sponsored Ukrainian schools since 1997.[9] Later, in 2000s, this situation has led to parallel official and informal use of Russian language. For example, Polese (2014) describing the process of Ukrainization in 2003-2008 after the Orange Revolution notes, that Ukrainian language named 'ridna mova' (native language) must be implemented in all strata of life. According to governmental discourses, in reality was only presented in Ukrainian official reports for Kiev in majority big cities

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[4] Pravfond 2013
[5] Baltijalv 2014
[6] Kovalenko 2010
[7] Ukrcensus 2001
[8] Shulga 2002
[9] Polese 2014, pp.72-73.

like Odessa.[10] Only in 2007, when the European Convention on Regional Languages was signed by Ukraine, did Russians receive the right to use their language officially in places of compact settlement (if they constitute more than 20% of the population), though this created even more contradictions, and later became the formal cause for the Ukrainian conflict.

Russian is also one of the official languages in the quasi states as Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These regions appeared to be under Russia's peace-keeping control since the beginning of the 1990s, just after the dissolution of the USSR. They declared sovereignty after the violation of their minority rights provoking violent conflicts.

Table 1.
Russians in Former Soviet Republics, 1989-2012

	Number of Russians by the census of 1989, thousands	Percentage of Russians to the total population, 1989	Net migration of Russians, 1990-1999, thousand	Net migration of Russians by 1999 as per cent of their original number in 1989	Number of Russians by the last census, thousands
Baltic states					
Estonia	475.0	30.3	57.7	12.0	340.7 (2012)
Latvia	906.0	34.0	91.2	9.2	556.4 (2011)
Lithuania	344.0	9.4	55.7	16.1	219.8 (2001)
Western CIS					
Belarus	1,342.0	13.2	20.6	1.9	785.0 (2009)
Moldova	562.0	13.0	53.2	9.0	412.0 (2004)
Ukraine	11,356.0	22.1	319.8	2.7	8,334 (2001)
Transcaucasus					
Armenia	52.0	1.6	30.0	56.5	15.0 (2001)
Azerbaijan	392.0	5.6	174.1	50.1	119.3 (2009)
Georgia	341.0	6.3	157.3	39.6	67.7 (2002)
Central Asian					
Kazakhstan	6,228.0	37.8	1085.2	16.1	3774,0 (2009)
Kyrgyzstan	917.0	21.5	215.6	23.0	419.6 (2009)
Tajikistan	388.0	7.6	218.8	55.8	68.0 (2000)
Turkmenistan	334.0	9.5	86.0	24.4	165.0 (2010)
Uzbekistan	1,653.0	8.3	420.1	24.0	1,199.0 (2000)
Total	25,289.0		2985.7	11.8	16,475.5

Source: Karachyrina 2013

[10] ibid.

Despite the official loss of status, more than 20 years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union Russian language still plays an important role in many former republics. For example, Gallup Poll results underscore the prevalence of the use of Russian over the national language in some countries, when asked in face-to-face interviews. An overwhelming majority opted for Russian as a language for conducting the interviews: in Ukraine 83%, in Kazakhstan 68%, and in Belarus 92%. In other republics, where the Russian diaspora is small, answers were: in Georgia 7%, in Azerbaijan 6% and in Armenia 3%. Kyrgyzstan with 38% and Moldova with 23% were in between.[11]

Table 1 shows how the Russian diaspora in CIS countries has shrunk from 25 to 16 million people. How many Russians live abroad? In the website of the Agency for Compatriots, the 'Russian world' population was evaluated as high as 30 million people, though it is not clear whom and how they counted.[12]

We can evaluate the flows of Russians that emigrated to other countries of the world based on the data of receiving countries. Between 1990 and 1999, emigration from Russia was about 100,000 per year and mainly consisted of ethnic Jews, Greeks, and Germans. In the 2000s it dropped to less than 15,000 per year, and was replaced by migration of skilled and highly educated ethnic Russians.[13] The destination countries for the ethnic flows were North America (40%, mainly to the USA) and Western Europe (more than 30%, mainly to Germany).

Denisenko argues[14] that the largest numbers of emigrants from Russia in the last 20 years went to the USA (about 500,000), Germany (191,300) and Canada (64,100), much less to Spain (31,800), Italy (34,400), and the Czech Republic (31,800). In addition, about 35,000-50,000 Russian students study abroad. Levada Centre experts count 1.5 million who emigrated to the 'far abroad', and Zaionchkovskaya also gives a similar figure,[15] However according to Vygaudas Ušackas, the Head of the EU delegation in Russia however, only about 2 million Russian citizens live in the EU.[16]

3. Formation of the Russian state policy on Compatriots

Russian policy on compatriots in the last quarter of a century experienced different turns and has suffered from disparity between declaration of goals and provision of funds. Periods of activity in the 1990s and since 2006 were interrupted by periods of stagnation

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[11] Gallup 2008. Conducted in 2006 and 2007 with approximately 1,000 residents, aged 15 or older.
[12] Rossotrudnichestvo 2014
[13] Korobkov 2010
[14] Denisenko,2013, pp. 156-157
[15] Kommersant 2013 and Zaionchkovskaya, 2007, respectively.
[16] Author's notes of Vygaudas Ušackas talk, the International conference "Migration Crisis – International cooperation and national strategies", on 22-23 September 2016, Moscow, Russian International Affairs Council.

from 2000 to 2005. But the rhetoric regarding the support of compatriots has been a permanent attribute of Russian politics. Analysis of governmental documents shows several stages in the formation of Compatriot policy:

- First period (1991- 2000): Tough rhetoric and assistance to forced re-settlers in Russia;
- Second period (2001-2005): Strengthening of domestic leadership and frozen compatriot policy activities;
- Third period (2006 – present): Revitalization of compatriots' 'soft' and 'hard' policy: "battle for minds" of the "Russian World".

3.1 First period (1991-2000): Tough rhetoric and assistance to forced re-settlers in Russia

The time of the foundation of a Compatriot policy was characterized by rising nationalism and the escalation of armed conflicts in many fSU countries, leading to a mass exodus of Russians to Russian homeland. The Russian government used the '*tragedy of the Russian people'* abroad to blame the governments of other countries, especially Estonia and Latvia, which in 1993 and 1994 adopted a discriminatory policy of naturalization and turned towards the EU. Real support to compatriots was limited to the measures on the settlement of ethnic Russian refugees, who arrived in Russia in large numbers (from 1992 to 1996 about one million forced migrants annually). In 1992, the government adopted the Federal state program 'Migration' and created the Federal Migration Service (FMS). The Ministry of Nationalities had also assisted in the management of the consequences of forced resettlement since 1993.

In this period, Russia was involved in several armed conflicts with its former republics. The roots of these interethnic conflicts of local authonomies with the governments of federal republics already existed at the end of 1980s but were hidden under "the carpet" of international friendship of nations in the USSR. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union conflicts immediately manifested in a struggle for sovereignty. As the result, Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia emerged under the protection of Russia's peace-keeping forces as unrecognized states. Their people obtained Russian citizenship, resulting in de facto dual citizenship for the respective population. Nowadays, for example, the population of Transnistria is constituted by citizens of Moldova (around 300,000 people), Russia (around 150,000) and Ukraine (around 100,000). Some have dual citizenship with Moldova and Ukraine, or Russia and Ukraine, and even triple citizenships – Moldovan, Russian and Ukrainian – are common.[17] The South Ossetian population has Russian and South Ossetian citizenship, and some have Georgian citizenship.

[17] Rosbalt 2006 and Pridnestrovie, 2014.

The 'Concept of Russia's Foreign Policy' (1993) developed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) at that time stressed *"the cessation of armed confrontations and ….guarante[ing] respect of HR and rights of minorities in the Near abroad, in particular ethnic Russians and the Russian speaking population'*.[18] But the economic transition and crisis undermined the support of the Russian-speaking population in the fSU countries.[19]

Nevertheless, several important unions were formed at that time in which Russia played an active role, like the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), distantly similar to EU and NATO. These institutions gave the population of the fSU some comfort of security, and preserved the system of free movement of people; otherwise the flows of Russian compatriots could have been more sizeable.

In August 1994, the decree 'On Main Directions of the State Policy toward Compatriots Residing Abroad' was signed by the Russian President. It determined three types of protected people: Russian citizens abroad, minorities, and stateless people in the CIS and the Baltic States. The integration of the Russian diaspora to the new realities was proclaimed as one of the main tasks of Russian policy. The State Commission on Compatriots in Russia and the Commission on HR of CIS countries were created in order to monitor the situation. An international agreement with 10 ex-Soviet countries on voluntary resettlement and protection of re-settlers' rights (including free transportation of returnees and their naturalization) was also signed at that time.[20]

An important step was the prolongation of acquisition of Russian citizenship for fSU citizens till 2001. Nevertheless, the Russian government did not urge Russians from the fSU to return, and cultural centers abroad received directions on the support of Russian diaspora organizations; by 1995 about 10 billion roubles (2 billion USD) had been allocated for the support of compatriot organizations, but their spending was not coordinated sufficiently and did not help much.[21] In addition, the Second Federal Program "Migration" was introduced in 1995 for the continuation of resettlement of compatriots, but the first Chechen war undermined its implementation.

At the end of the 1990s, the preparations of the Baltic countries to join the EU and NATO stimulated the revitalization of compatriot policy, and finally in 1999 the Federal Law "On the State Policy of the Russian Federation Regarding Compatriots Abroad," was adopted. It defined the term 'compatriots abroad' as:

- citizens of the Russian Federation living abroad;
- individuals that used to have Soviet citizenship;

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[18] Mukomel 2000, p.250
[19] Rossotrudnichestvo, 2014
[20] Mukomel & Pain, 2000
[21] id.

- individuals who emigrated from the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation;
- descendants of compatriots "with the exception of descendants of individuals representing titular nations of foreign countries."

The self-identification of 'compatriots' was a matter of free individual choice, but the post-Soviet generations of titular groups have become strangers for Russia according to this law.[22]

The law promised economic, political and cultural support to compatriots, but in reality, the state lacked the funds for such provision. The main support was focused on Russian-speaking schools, cultural events and higher education (Slavic universities and branches of Russian universities in CIS countries). The second Chechen war again undermined the compatriot policy through scarcity of funds. If in 1996-1997 about 6 billion USD were allocated to compatriots support, by 1999 the funds had already been cut to 2 million USD.[23]

3.2 Second period (2000-2005): Strengthening domestic leadership and economic pragmatism in compatriot policy

At the beginning of the 2000s the flow of repatriates dried up, but the domestic problems of the separatist tendencies among the elites of the ethnic republics in Russia and terrorism of Islamic fundamentalists persisted. The 9/11 terrorist attack in the USA shifted the attention of the government to illegal migration and separatism.[24] For Vladimir Putin, the new leader of Russia, the main task was to impose order on regional elites and strengthen the control of federal power in the country. The financial support of compatriot policy was abandoned for almost five years and activities on resettlement of compatriots were frozen. The Federal program 'Migration' from 2001 was no longer renewed and the Ministry of National Affairs was abolished. The Russian federal budget no longer had a particular line for the financial support of compatriots abroad.[25]

The new law 'On citizenship' (2001) and 'On foreigners' (2002) put an end to the easy access for citizens of the fSU to Russian citizenship. Some indulgence was granted only to former Soviet military officers, participants of WWII, and graduates from Russian institutes of higher education who found a job in Russia. The creation of the International Council of Russian Compatriots (ICRC 2013) in 2003 was more of a symbolic action. The influence of Russia in international policy was also shrinking. The EU established the European (Eastern) Neighborhood Policy in 2003 for the securitization of the neighborhood before the enlargement, a policy that proposed closer cooperation for

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[22] Zevelev 2008
[23] Mukomel 2005
[24] Molodikova 2007
[25] Mukomel 2002

Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in various activities with the EU. Russia decided not to join this program, evaluating it as an EU-centered policy. A special EU-Russia program was worked out, separating Russia from other Eastern fSU in their relations with EU.

In addition, the enlargement of the NATO in 1999 and EU in 2004 including the Baltic States, meant the introduction of EU visa regulations, reducing the opportunities of stateless compatriots in these countries for free movement. Only in 2006 did the EU allow them free movement in the region, and Russia introduced a unilateral visa free regime for them in 2008.

Soon after the EU enlargement, on July 19, 2004 the Security Council of the RF held a meeting "On the policy of the Russian Federation in the CIS". President Putin stated that the CIS faced a choice: either there would be strengthening of cooperation, or the erosion of its geopolitical space and declining interest of member countries. This latter, he stated, should be prevented. He stressed the growing political and economic competition with other global players in this space, which has to be weakened by alternative structures like the Organization of the Collective Security Treaty and Eurasian Economic Community as an economic counterbalance to EU, created in 2007. He also proposed the free movements of goods, capital, people and services between the member states.[26]

At this meeting, Putin emphasized the necessity to protect the rights of compatriots: *"the violation of the rights of our compatriots, we do not have to watch in silence, we need to respond accordingly; but, of course, this reaction should be in manners that lead to the achievement of a positive result. This should not be a reaction for the reaction.*[27]

Unexpected failures for Russia in 2004 and 2005 happened when color revolutions in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine changed their political affiliation. Nevertheless, this political choice was not supported by the economic capabilities of the respective countries because of the high level of dependency on Russian energy and remittance of their labor migrants from Russia. From 2004 onwards, Russia has launched a policy of 'trade wars' toward these countries to punish the unfaithful allies.[28] This led to the deterioration of economic situation in these countries and the grievances groups of the population, regarding the policy of their governments, supporting push labor migration and the desire of some migrants for resettlement to Russia.

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[26] Zasedania soveta bezopasnosti RF 19 July 2004 ‘O politike Rossiiskoi Federatsii na prostranstve SNG”. http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/55.html

[27] Ibid.

[28] For example, with Georgia and Moldova, wine wars (2006), or with Ukraine, the meat embargo.

From 2005 onward, Russia has articulated a 'pragmatic' approach towards CIS countries by introducing European prices for natural gas exports. The prices for every country were closely related also to the attitude toward Russia and sometimes to Russian-speaking populations in these countries.

The orientation of Ukraine towards the EU after the Orange revolution led to even more rapid Ukrainization in all spheres of life and in language policy of education, and the squeezing out education in Russian, especially by the adoption of the plan on *"Development and functioning of the Ukrainian language"*. This program even provided the creation of public school committees on '*public language control'* in Western regions like Ivano-Frankovsk, that have to check the language children used to communicate in Russian and Polish classes.[29] In higher education, Russian was actively replaced by Ukrainian as well. The issue of the status of Russian has been raised several times by the opposition in the Rada, with no results.

Thus, during the beginning of Putin's governance in the 2000s, governmental rhetoric was supportive, but Russian compatriots' policy was limited mainly to activities of Russian schools abroad. So, Russian population tried to do the best for the integration in the new realities. As a research conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs[30] had shown in 2004, only 10% of the Russian-speaking population from the Baltic countries, Ukraine and Belarus were actually ready to migrate to Russia. A high proportion of potential migrants was observed only in the Central Asia (Tajikistan – 57%, Kyrgyzstan – 44%, and Kazakhstan – 41%). The diasporas at that time were poorly organized. People tried to adapt themselves to new conditions and survive on their own.

3.3 Third period (2006-present) Pragmatism and the development of a new Russian policy on compatriots

The strengthening of the 'vertical of power' in domestic affairs by Vladimir Putin in the mid-2000s gave him more opportunities for the foreign affairs – to pay more attention to Russia's image abroad. The adoption of the *Program of Work with Compatriots Abroad for 2006-2008, The Russian Language Federal Target Program (2006-2010), and The State Program for Assistance to the Voluntary Resettlement of Compatriots Living Abroad* in 2006 gave a new impetus to the compatriot policy. Issues related to the compatriots were also reflected in the Concept of Foreign Policy of Russia (2008), identifying the tasks of protection of compatriots abroad, improvement of the image of Russia and Russian language and cultural heritage in the world. The Foundation "Russian world" of compatriots has to be the fundament for the development of Russian language and culture in CIS countries and around the world. These ambitious declarations were

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[29] Fesenko 1998; Beletski, 2006
[30] On Russian Diaspora 2004

not supported (as usual) by relevant finances (about $34 million USD were allocated for the policy and $1 million USD for language activities).[31]

However, in addition to the revitalization of the Compatriot Policy, a new Demographic Policy (2006) was adopted that presented the government's main concerns regarding the demographic crisis. The census of 2002 showed that in the thirteen years between 1989 and 2002 the population of the Russian Federation decreased by 3.1 million people, despite of a total migration inflow of about 6 million people. The demographic forecasts were very pessimistic, putting the country's future and security under threat due to depopulation. The natural decline in the economically active population was expected to reach about 18 million by 2026. The accessible inflow potential from Russian diaspora in CIS countries was evaluated at about 3-4 million. In addition to this, there were potentially 6-7 million people of ethnic titular groups from CIS countries.[32]

The presidential decree of June 22, 2006 'On measures for the facilitation of voluntary resettlement of compatriots living abroad in the Russian Federation' was the starting point of the program. Resettlement followed a simplified procedure of getting residence and work permits. Housing problems were also to be solved by regional authorities. In the first two years the program did not work properly because of financial shortcomings in the regions, poor dissemination of information and a ban on the involvement of students and migrants who were already in Russia. As a result, only about 8000 people arrived. The other problem was the lack of Russian-speaking re-settlers.[33] A new survey of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs[34] , which was similar to the one conducted in 2004, indicated the increase the number of people that want to return to Russia from Tajikistan (72%), from Kyrgyzstan (68%), but also from Moldova (44%) and from Ukraine (23%). Only for Kazakhstan did the number of potential returnees drop, from 41% in 2004 to 29% in 2012, mainly because the economic situation improved dramatically there. In Latvia it was only 3.1% in comparison to 10% in 2004, with the Russian population presenting a pragmatic approach to resettlement and being neutral towards resettlement. In spite of the fact that most compatriots from the Baltic States do not plan to migrate to Russia, among factors that might precipitate their return, about 20% listed discrimination, and conflicts with the local population.

Unfortunately, the relations of Russia with pro-western CIS allies have deteriorated. The replacement of Russian language in the school curricula continued in Ukraine and the Baltic states. The ratification of the European Charter on Regional Languages by Ukraine in 2007, gave the first legal statement for Russian as a minority language. At the same time, it created a conflictual situation, because the ethnic minority had to constitute at least 20% of the population in the territory of the region. However, as in

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[31] Zevelev 2008
[32] Zajonchkovskaya 2007, pp. 228-229
[33] Molodikova 2008
[34] Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012

other fSU republics, Russians live mainly in cities and their proportion in rural areas was rather low. So, in majority of regions in Ukraine the proportion of Russians was calculated to under 20%.

One more discord between the former allies was Georgia and Ukraine's decision to join NATO after the colored revolutions 2004 and 2005[35]. Georgia's wish to join NATO was clouded by the existence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, that were outside of its control. In 2008, Georgia tried to return its lost provinces, and a Russian-Georgian five-day war gave a clear message to the international community that, in a situation of conflict, Russia would protect its compatriots. The war ended with the official recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states by Russia, and the possession of Georgia and Ukraine to be the member of NATO in future was suspended.[36]

In the same year, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, established the Federal Agency 'Rossotrudnichestvo" under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the consolidation of the Russian diaspora abroad, to preserve ethnic identity, attract compatriots to their historical homeland and protect the rights and freedoms of compatriots abroad.[37]

The completion of this task was left to a system of NGOs formed by compatriots in their respective countries of residence that are united by councils of compatriots in every country.The representatives of countries' councils are united by the regional councils (like the European, the North American and so on) and the representatives of regional councils form the World Council of Russian Compatriots. For five years, starting in 2008, the mushrooming of compatriot organizations clearly indicated the high potential of Russian compatriots to be involved in various activities. In 2010, the World Council of Russian Compatriots united already 137 organizations from 52 countries.[38]

The Russian strategy to unite compatriots all over the world since 2008 has become part of a regional geopolitical project for the economic, political and ideological consolidation of countries of the former Soviet Union. Similarly to the EU structure, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan established the Eurasian Customs Union (2010), the new Eurasian Economic Commission in 2011, and the Single Economic Space (SES) in 2012, whilethe European Economic Unions was founded in 2015 with the tasks of free movement of people, goods, and capital. The amendment to the law On Compatriots in 2010 expanded the definition of compatriots to *"any citizen of the former SU even if she or he or their descendants never lived in the RSFSR (now Russian Federation)'*. In the same year, the list of persons eligible to participate in the resettlement program was also extended to include migrants, already temporarily or permanently living in

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[35] 'Zyrnalistskaya Pravda 2015
[36] Mankoff 2008
[37] Rossotrudnichestvo 2013
[38] Mezhdunarodniy Soviet Rossiyskih Soochestvennikov, http://www.msrs.ru/about

Russia. The amendments led to an increase in the number of arrivals from 8,000 in 2008, to 57,000 in 2013.[39]

In May 2013, Vladimir Putin signed an order to strengthen the role of *Rossotrudnichestvo* as a 'soft power' comparable to USAID Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs. *Rossotrudnichestvo's* budget is projected more than quadruple, to 9.5 billion RUR (about 300 million USD) by 2020.[40] In 2013, a plan was announced to reopen Russian schools (with a curriculum organized according to Russian educational standards) in the former CIS countries and the Baltic States to protect the Russian diaspora populations from assimilation.[41]

To attract young compatriots to Russia, a new brain-gain education policy was also proposed. The Compatriot Program provides special fellowships for children of Russian descendants in higher education institutions of Russia (for example, about 11,000 were granted for the academic year 2013-2014). In 2013, already about 40 branches of different Russian universities worked in nine CIS countries.[42]

Interestingly, the expansion of the definition of 'compatriot' at the end of the 2000s raised the issue of resettlement of about 100,000 Adygs from Syria: descendants of Adygs, deported after the Caucasus war in 1862-1864 by the Tsar to the Ottoman Empire. The Russian government has allowed their limited repatriation (only 500 people annually).

In parallel to the Russian activities and development of the Eurasian Economic Union project, the EU initiative of Eastern Partnership gained new economic dimension and financial support from 2009. It aimed to harmonize economic, trade and financial relations between the EU and countries like Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. The idea of lifting the visa regime and future integration was proposed to them as an attraction for the population. Thus, the period from 2009-2013 was characterized by considerable activity of both the EU and Russia in strengthening their ties with potential allies for future cooperation, and both sides have finally become competitors for the countries 'in between'.[43] Russia's relatively good economic performance continued to attract migrants from all CIS countries (table 2), but the share of migrants to the EU is slowly increasing and competition for labor resources has already been observed in 2007.[44]

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[39] Chudinovski 2014
[40] Chernenko 2013
[41] Pravfond 2013; Kosachev, 2012
[42] Romodanovski 2013
[43] Korosteleva 2014
[44] Molodikova 2007

Table 2.
Countries of main destination of EaP Migrants 2013.

Countries of origin	% to EU	% to Russia	% to other
Armenia	4	74	22
Azerbaijan	1	77	22
Belorussia	4	90	6
Georgia	35	40	25
Moldova	21	64	14
Ukraine	44	47	8
Total	29	56	14

Source: Barbone et al. 2013

The Eurasian Customs Union has faced competition from the EU-centered inter-regionalist policy of the European Neighborhood Partnership Initiative since 2009. This sense of rivalry between the two regional powers in the neighborhood was registered by public opinion as 'alarming' in Ukraine and in Moldova.[45]

The Association Agreement of Georgia and Moldova was a minor loss for Russia, given the small Russian-speaking community there, but Ukraine is a different matter. For Ukraine, the political, economic and ideological competition between the EU and Russia, as the leader of the Eurasian Customs Union, has deadlocked. Ukraine disposes of the largest Russian-speaking diaspora in the world, living mainly in the East and in Crimea, where the main geopolitical and economic interests of Russia are focused.

The victory of Viktor Yanukovich in the 2010 elections in Ukraine showed that about half of the population in Ukraine still had pro-Russian sentiments. Some improvement in relations were observed between Russia and Ukraine under Viktor Yanukovich (2009-2014), when Russia extended the stay of the Russian navy in Sevastopol, and a law was signed by Yanukovich that gave Russian the status of a regional language in regions with ten per cent of the population using it as native.[46] Nevertheless, the Ukrainian government rhetoric on future developments was ambiguous. To the younger population (mainly Ukrainian speakers) the government promised a shift towards the EU due to the Association Agreement, for the older population (mainly Russian-speaking, who feared losing ties with the Russian motherland and possible restructuring of economic relations with Russia), it promised friendship and economic cooperation with Russia.

The withdrawal from signature of the Association Agreement with the EU drove about the half of the population into a revolutionary situation supported by EU and US

[45] Korosteleva 2014
[46] In the Convention on regional languages (2007) status was granted with twenty per cent of minority in region.

governments, while the other half was politicized by Russian propaganda, and both identities were mobilized through media and internet. Finally, what some Ukrainian scholars and politicians[47] prognosed in the 1990s happened: the long-standing gap between the political and legal status from one side and social status of Russian culture and language among Ukrainian citizens from the other side, was one of the reasons for the constant political confrontation around the problems of Russian culture and language. Finally, this gap became the split and the key argument in claims by the Eastern and Southern regions for sovereignty. The cleavage in the Ukrainian society between desires of development either with EU or Eurasian Union from November 2013 led to a coup d'état in February 2014. The redistribution of power in Ukraine, with the growing influence of right-wing nationalist groups consequently led to the ethnic mobilization of Russian diaspora along politicized lines.

The Supreme Rada's decision to withdraw the status of Russian as a regional language in February 2014, after dismissing President Yanukovich, was seen as a punishment for the Russian-speaking population for Russia's pressure on the Ukrainian government. Although quickly removed, this decision played a negative role in the impending crisis. The referendum in Crimea was the continuation of a situation presented at a conference in Odessa in September 2013 by a professor from Tavrida University (in Simferopol) on the history curriculum in schools and universities. She stated bitterly *'there is no place for Crimean history in the curriculum on the history of modern Ukraine'*. To fill this gap, the local Crimean government, for several years, supported an initiative of academics and NGOs to develop a curriculum on Crimean history, 'Krimovedenie', and laid the ground for alienation.

When aggressive attacks on historical symbols of identity of Ukrainian and Russian ethnic groups began, the threat to the Russian minority in the Eastern part of Ukraine and the Crimean Peninsula provided a good opportunity for Vladimir Putin to declare the right to protect compatriots. The Crimea referendum and its merging with Russia, the declaration of the Novorossia Federation by the separatists from one side and the introduction of the anti-terrorist operation by the Ukrainian state from the other side, proved once again the vital importance of identity and language issues for minorities.

Military operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions are the main source of forced migrants. According to different sources, there were almost 1.7 million internally displaced people (IDP) until January 2016 in Ukraine.[48] Among them, there are 168,545 children, 491,374 disabled people and older persons. These people are mainly from Donetsk and Luhansk regions (996,553 persons), and from the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol city (21,931 persons). Almost the same number of people surged into Ukrainian border regions with Russia and Belarus. During the period from April 1, 2014 until February 2016 about 1.2 million Ukrainians entered the territory of

[47] Shulga 2002
[48] Dryzinin 2016

the Russian Federation from the South-Eastern parts of Ukraine.[49] Majority of the people got different status of protection. Russia intensified its policy on voluntary resettlement of Ukrainian compatriots to Russia. About 170 thousands of forced migrants decided to participate in the resettlement program. Most of them came from Donetsk and Luhansk regions.[50]

Russia considerably changed its legislation and citizenship policy from 2014 as response on the Ukranian crisis, in order to simplify the application process for citizenship, especially for the Ukrainians. In fact, it also proposed automatic naturalization for 2 million Ukrainian citizens in the Crimean Peninsula without their renunciation of Ukrainian citizenship. A new option for Russian-speaking people was introduced for naturalization – "Russian-speaking people" (nositel russkogo yazika).

4. Professional compatriots vs. amateur compatriots

Since the Ukrainian crisis erupted, the Russian threat has been perceived as very serious in the Baltic States and some other countries. These perceptions go against expert opinions, for example, like those of expert Igor Zevelev, who evaluated a possibility of ethnic conflict as an event of "very small chance'.[51] In light of the crisis, we can discuss how effectively Russian compatriots' communities in the countries of their settlement are organized to implement Russian policy on compatriots.

If in the mid-2000s Russian communities were characterized by disunity, with poor horizontal and vertical ties[52], the situation has changed since 2008, when the Russian government created Federal Agency *Rossotrudnichestvo* under the umbrella of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Vertical and horizontal relations have been established in every country between newly organized NGOs and the country, region and world coordination councils that unite compatriots. Russian media resources established by compatriots since 1991 have gained support by Russian government from that time. They formed a World Association of Russian Media (1999) that unites TV, newspapers, radio and e-media, about 3000 different Russian media outlets in 70 countries, to present a friendly image of Russia around the world. A special Fund to Support Human Rights of Compatriots and the "Russian World" Fund provide financial and legal assistance to compatriots abroad.

On the political level Russian diaspora may create its political parties, such as the Russian party in Estonia (which did not pass the threshold), or they cooperate with other entities, like with a Latvian party *"Saskana" (Consensus)*[53], which also enjoyed little

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[49] FMS 2016
[50] Sidorchyk 2016
[51] Zevelev 2008
[52] id.
[53] V Rossii sozdan fond poderzhHki ruUsskoyYazichnih SMI, 26.12.2014

success in elections. In Moldova, the civil movement "Motherland – Eurasian Union" is supported by the "League of Russian Youth", but since the Association Agreement with EU was signed by Moldova, they are unlikely to find many supporters. In Ukraine, the Russian Party "Russian Blok" existed from 2001 to 2011, and their biggest success was their support of Viktor Yanukovich when he promised the status of the second official language to Russian. This party failed to win any significant support in the 2012 Ukrainian elections and decided to dissolve in the same year.

Nevertheless, the 'Coordination Council of Organizations of Russian Compatriots' in Ukraine in December 2010 counted 19 All-Ukraine organizations of compatriots and 43 in major cities, including 11 in Sevastopol, 13 in Kiev, 11 in Kharkov oblast and 8 in Nikolaev oblast. It is difficult to judge their activities, but they are supported by the sympathies of the Russian population in Ukraine and their orientation towards their kin state, shaping public opinion.[54]

Relatively old Russian communities exist in former socialist countries like Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and the Czech Republic. They use a well-developed Soviet infrastructure, which Russia inherited from the USSR (school buildings, houses, clubs, and cultural centers) making it easier for compatriots to get together for different activities. For example, there has been an initiative of compatriots in Hungary, where the Russian compatriot community tried to apply for minority status based on Hungarian legislation, when Ukrainians and Ruthenians (or Karpato-Russians) acquired minority status in 1991. According to Hungarian minority rights legislation, an ethnic group can apply for minority status if it can prove that it has been present in Hungary for at least 100 years, and can raise support from 1000 inhabitants (who must also be citizens of Hungary).

The first attempt to apply for minority status was made in 1996, but applicants were not well prepared and the initiative collected fewer than 1,000 signatures. The issue was suspended, then in 2008, after '*Rossotrudnichestvo'* formed the Coordination Council of Compatriots in Hungary the issue emerged in discussions again. This Council initiated the formation of 14 organizations of Russian Compatriots as legal entities in the seven largest cities. Financial support from Russia since 2008 has prompted different cultural and education activities of compatriots all over Hungary, and the discussion of minority claims has become an important topic on the Council's agenda. Similar activization has been observed in other countries where Russians formed some NGOs. It can be seen on the internet portal of the Coordination Council of Compartiots and on its regional and countries branches.[55]

At first sight, it seems that the revitalization of compatriots policy has been successful. However, problems and conflicts have emerged in many countries among compatriots.

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[54] Russkie na Ukraine, http://www.rus.in.ua/news/8975.html
[55] http://vksrs.com/

According to my personal observation, experiences during the last six years highlighted the contradictions in regards of compatriot groups on one side and heads of compatriots' councils in some countries (in the Baltic States, Benelux, Hungary, and Ukraine) on the other. Representatives of some organizations criticize the implementation of the compatriots' policy because of the cleavage between compatriots who can be called *'professional"*, and their opponents, who we can describe as '**amateur compatriots'.** These cleavages are mainly created by local Councils, often functioning in an undemocratic way on redistributing the funds.

The leader of the Dutch community even wrote an open letter to Russia's leaders, publicizing the discords.[56] He was dissatisfied with the strategy of Agency 'Rossotrudnichestvo's and the Russian Embassy's work, which he believes caused harm to compatriot policy. The redistribution of grants among the loyal diaspora organizations and Ministry of Foreign Affairs are controlled via heads of Coordination Councils, who do not protect the real interests of the diaspora. The election of Russian compatriot leaders is, in fact, a formality, because they are appointed solely by the Foreign Ministry.

My own experience of work with the Coordination Council of Compatriots in Hungary shows that – in spite of the support of cultural and educational activities of compatriots in Hungary – this critique has some ground. There is no transparency in fund distribution, and nobody knows how much funds the Councils have in reality or how they are spent.

The opposition compatriots in other countries also criticize Russian officials for their lack of real interest in Compatriot matters. For example, during their visits to Ukraine, Chairman of the Senate of Russian Federation V. Matvienko, Prime Minister D. Medvedev, and other politicians could not find time to meet with Russian compatriots and NGO activists.[57] But maybe these people did not belong to the group of "professional" compatriots, because Russian Embasseys in all countries regulary organize official events and "professional" compatriots usually invited. It seems that the Russian diplomatic nomenclature style of work has not changed its bureaucratic nature over time.

5. Conclusions

It is hard to define the concept of "compatriot" in Russian politics. It is rather vague because of the multi-ethnicity of (the former USSR and) Russia. The meaning of this term in legal documents has changed since the 1990s, including the definition of 2010 'all citizens of former Soviet Union' and Russian Empire (even the indigenous population) and their descendants that gives Russia the 'right to protect' the population of the former Soviet empire.

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[56] Pasternak 2013
[57] Zarkalo 2013

Russian policy on compatriots has changed several times because of the internal situation but rhetorically always supported "Russian World". In the 1990s, it was limited mainly to providing assistance to those who resettled in times of mass forced migration to Russia because of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia did not support separatist activities because of the wars for sovereignty in Chechnya. Nevertheless, the organization of the CIS, free movement, and sets of different CIS agreements including dual citizenship or liberal accusation of Russian citizenship helped in the integration of compatriots to the new realities.

Compatriot policy was neglected in the first five years of Putin's presidency (2000-2005) because he built the power vertical by strengthening control over national and regional elites. At that time, the majority of Russian diasporas were poorly organized, with no unity of interests due perhaps to a high level of diversity and lack of funds for activities.

From 2006, the government turned its attention back to the compatriot policy, because of internal problems of the demographic crisis and the desire to strengthen the economic and political influence of Russia among CIS countries. The definition of compatriots was expanded to assist in the *implementation* of Russia's ambitious plans for the creation of a new Eurasian Economic Area and security institutions as a counterbalance to EU and NATO.

The structure of compatriots' councils was built with the transformation of 'amateur' compatriots into 'professionals' through the creation of Russian NGOs. This strategy has had both positive and negative effects: on one hand it revitalized the life of diasporas and united them under the country Councils, while on the other hand, diaspora NGOs have become more dependent on provided funds, tasks of supported activities and control of representatives by bureaucrats from the MFA. The lack of transparency in redistribution of funds creates conflicts inside some diasporas between "professional" and "amateur" compatriots.

The influence of compatriots varies across countries, but it seems they share the Russian government's pragmatic attitude to the diaspora. In Western countries people migrate mainly for economic reasons. Even in the Baltic states, where the situation is the worst due to the violation of the rights of the Russian minority, statelessness and shrinking of Russian education, the level of desire to return to Russia is very low, as compatriots prefer to migrate to other EU countries. In Central Asia in opposite, the economic development is low and the possession to migrate to Russia is the highest, in spite of their better status Russians have there.

Russia presents itself as a country with imperial historical background and at least as a regional power it tries to incorporate the population and economies of neighboring countries that are historically and geopolitically closely related to Russia into its sphere of control by using various instruments, including compatriots' policy. The resettlement

of 9.6 million people with naturalization over 20 years, most of them (8.6 million) clearly shows this as a mainstream policy. The foreign policy, in respect of compatriots, also works in this direction. The armed conflict in Ukraine has been the result of combination of factors that have emerged in Ukraine. It was influenced by Ukrainian position of staying 'in between' Russia and EU and was not a direct consequence of the Russian policy on compatriots. Nevertheless, one of the justifications for taking control over Crimea was the argument of protection for Russian-speaking population on the territory that historically belonged to Russian Empire, USSR and now should belong to Russia as descedant of the USSR provided that there is a consensus of majority of population who lives there.

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GALINA OSADCHAYA and TATIANA YUDINA

MIGRATION PROCESSES AND RUSSIA' S MIGRATION POLICY: FROM THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES TO THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION (1991 – 2015)

Factors, directions and volumes of migration flows in Russia have changed noticeably in the past 25 years. The disintegration of the USSR, and the deterioration of social-economic and political conditions that occurred in the early 1990s in the greater part of newly emerged sovereign states, brought about a shift in internal migration flows from the predominantly educational, marriage and push-pull migration flows of the 1980s to forced migration of immigrants and refugees. The beginning of economic growth in Russia and in the poor performance of other economies of the post-Soviet states in the 2000s led to the growth of labor migration both legal and illegal. After the crisis of 2008-2009 the latter grew sharply.

Russia's migration policies sought to response adequately to these challenges. Its policies have shifted from migration unregulated by the state, to highly restrictive, and to moderate liberalization. At every stage changes were aimed at supporting the positive development of the Russian society. They were economic requirements, the interests of the national security, the protection of public order and public health, and international obligations, but these policies achieved different degrees of success in solving the problems of Russia as a receiving society.[1]

Nowadays new emphases are related to refugees from Ukraine, freedom of labor force movement within frameworks of the new integration expanse, the Eurasian economic union, and recent events with refugees in Europe. As a result, Russia is developing a new stage in its migration policy. To create a more efficient system of migration management and maximize the benefits of migration, it is necessary to understand and evaluate the migration processes, practices and policies of Russia from 1991-2015, including their problems and contradictions.

1. Methods and procedures of the study

This article is based on results of surveys carried out under the supervision of this article's authors. These surveys are:

[1] Yudina 2011

- analysis of documents of national statistics and publications of experts engaged in studies of migration processes in Russia from 1990 to 2015 and works of scientists investigating migration situation in Russia;
- interviews with 25 experts who represent bodies of power, the Federal Migration Service, public and non-governmental organizations, academic community) in February-April of 2009. Interviews were aimed at disclosure of problems of migration from Armenia and Georgia to Moscow. Selection of experts was done by method of formalized screening and snowball method;
- structured interviews with migrants from Armenia and Georgia (2009 and 2012). 200 migrants from Armenia and 200 migrants from Georgia were polled in every inquiry. Respondents were selected by snowball method by single characteristic: migrants had to have arrived in Moscow from Armenia or Georgia after 1990;
- analysis of newspaper publications which was carried out in 2009, 2012 and 2015 to keep track of events related to migration and in the Russian media, documents of government institutions, economic, political and cultural organizations, publications of research centers, non-governmental organizations, and international agencies;
- monitoring of social sphere of Russia in 1992-2009. The selection represents the urban and rural population of the Russia Federation aged 18 or older. Surveys (structured interviews) were done annually. Selection of 2500 persons, males and females who reside in Russia permanently in 9 Federal circuits, 41 constituent parts of the Russian Federation, 105 settlements. Selection error is ~+-2,6%;
- polls of the population of Russia carried out within frameworks of the State Order to the Russian Academy of sciences Institute of social-political studies on "Social-political dimension of the Eurasian integration" topic in February, 2014, February, 2016. The selection represents urban and rural population of the Russian Federation aged 18 or older. In the process of structured interviews, 1500 persons, males and females who reside in Russia permanently, in 9 Federal circuits, 41 constituent parts of the Russian Federation, 105 settlements were polled. Selection error is ~+-2,6%;
- semi-formalized interview on "Migrants from countries-members of the Eurasian economic union at Moscow labor market". The poll was conducted in June, 2015. 100 migrants from each of the following countries (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) were polled. These migrants were selected by snowball method by the single feature: they had arrived in Moscow after 2000.

2. Trends of migration process transformation in Russia, 1991-2015

Across the period under investigation, migration exchange of Russia with post-Soviet states varied in volume due to various factors. But indicators of migration throughout the period had a positive trend and compensated for the depopulation of Russia. From 1991 to 2015 the population of the Russian Federation increased by more than 6.0 million people due to immigration from the CIS countries. However, if the number of migrants is considered on a year by year basis then this increment is distributed unevenly.

It peaked in 1994 due predominantly to ethnic Russians. Their migration attitudes were shaped by the instability of the social-political situation, widespread nationalism, intolerance to persons who did not belong to the titular nations, and discrimination in new states based on ethnic, religious and other characteristics. By the early 1990s, 25.3 million Russians and about 4 million representatives of other titular nations of Russia lived outside the confines of Russia; when the single union state disintegrated, all these people became national minorities.[2] During the subsequent severe social and economic crisis and armed conflicts, Russia performed the role of common home for these people.

From 1995 to 1999 immigration from post-Soviet countries started to decrease, initially due to military operations in Chechnya, then due to the financial crisis of 1998. The crisis of 1998 clearly illustrates the speed with which the population reacts to the changing situation. The year 2000 interrupted the descending trend, and the consequences of financial crisis of 1998 that were the most painful for migration were subdued.

Table 1.
Dynamics of Russia's population increment due to migration from the CIS countries, 1991-2000, thousand persons

Years	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Migration increase	104.9	355.7	553.8	914.6	612.2	438.8	433.3	361.8	237.0	266.9

Sources: statistics from annual demographic reports edited by A. G. Vishnevski; reports for years 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001

After 2000, as a result of the drastic thickening of the migrant registration procedure, residence permits granting to migrants and receipt of the Russian citizenship by migrants declined again considerably. At the same time, due to the introduction of new migration laws, the number of undocumented migrants rose. By 2001 the official migration inflow to Russia had in fact nearly dropped to zero. As the current registration demonstrates, the number of incomers to Russia dropped to half of what it was in 2000. This testified to the fact that the law on legal status of foreign citizens in the Russian Federation had never been passed.

Starting with 2003 population figures gradually began to rise, determined not so much by increase of entries to Russia but a decrease in departures. In 2006, the population increased by 154,500 due to migration, 1.7 times more than in 2003.

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[2] The Population of Russia 2000, p. 111

Table 2.
Dynamics of Russia's population increment due to migration from the CIS countries, 2001-2015, thousand persons

Years	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Migration increase	123.7	124.3	132.6	133.7	151.8	165.3	260.8	258,9	259.9	155.6[3]	287.9	268.4	274.9	260.1	228.2

Sources: statistics from annual demographic reports edited by A. G. Vishnevski; Reports for years 2002, 1999, 2000 and 2001

A fast growth in the legal labor migration of foreign laborers can be observed in migration flows. In 2006 such migrants exceeded 1 million in comparison with 702,500 in 2005, 469,400 in 2004, and 380,000 in 2003.[4] Types of immigration were also changing. Experts polled in our study,[5] noted that whereas earlier the main motives were political, cultural, and social, by 2008 economic motives started to predominate. This is confirmed by answers given by migrants from Armenia and Georgia in the course of interviews. Migrants from Armenia designated the following priority motives for their coming to Russia: job search, chance to earn more, education, family reunification, confidence that a person will find a place in business the Armenian immigrant community is engaged in, and search for a better life. Migrants from Georgia indicated the following priority motives: job search, political instability, disagreement with policy pursued by leadership of their country, education, creation of new business, family reunification, availability of the Georgian immigrant community, and search for a better life. The change in the ethnic composition of migrants and the increase, of the number of migrants from small towns and villages since 2007, were important peculiarities. This decreased migrants' readiness to live in big cities as centers of labor migrant attraction.[6]

A gradual growth in migration increment due to inflow from the CIS countries began in 2006. In 2007-2008 the migration increment was 260,000, 100,000 more than in 2006. Number of labor migrants also increased to around 2.5 million in 2008. However, according to expert appraisals, the real number of labor migrants far exceeded official data, and it is estimated at 3 to 7 million people. The figures for 2008 confirmed the stability of the trend of migration from countries of Central Asia. The global crisis of 2008-2009 reduced migration somewhat but did not reverse the trend. No landslide change occurred; on the contrary, many migrants preferred to stay in Russia because of a wait-and-see attitude.[7] According to data obtained by the Center for Migration Studies, in 2008 and 2009 nearly 60% of migrants from the CIS countries had a long-term migration strategy in that period and over one quarter were oriented to permanent residence in Russia[8].

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[3] Accounting principles 2011
[4] The Population of Russia. 2006, p. 231-242
[5] Osadchaya 2011
[6] Osadchaya 2013
[7] The Population of Russia 2008, pp. 266 – 267
[8] The Population of Russia 2008, p. 267

Right after the crisis, restrictions in regulation of migration were introduced. Due to growing unemployment, the rules for migrant employment were made more rigorous and quotas for foreigners' employment fell by half. Additionally, a list of professions open for foreign workers was introduced, while employers were bound to declare vacancies. All this brought about a sharp drop in the net inflow of migrants to 155,700. Flow from all CIS countries declined, and a landslide of migrants flow occurred in the sphere of labor migration too. In 2010, 1.6 million foreign citizens were working legally in Russia, 30% lower than in 2009. Stiffening of the rules regulating legal migration brought about a relative growth of illegal migration.[9]

It should be noted that despite the fact that in 2010 Russia avoided natural population decline, as Vishinski notes,[10] a natural decrease will inevitably come back and some time later may become quite considerable. This will stretch the problem of able-bodied population replenishment via migration to the utmost, as confirmed by calculations of the Russian State Committee for Statistics: natural decline of able-bodied potential of Russia is expected up to the mid-21st century at least. The problem is aggravated by the extreme unevenness of able-bodied population dynamics, which increases the importance of migration for the Russian labor market.

Labor migration that replaced resettlement for permanent residence has become a serious challenge in the past four years (2011-2015). The very composition and profile of labor migrants has changed: while in 2000 half of labor migrants were natives of distant foreign countries, in 2012 such people comprised only 8.1% of migrants. Workers from Central Asia began to enter the Russian labor market en masse, increasing from 6.3% to 72.5% of all labor migrants.[11] Between 2011 and 2015, 122,000 highly qualified specialists received work permits.[12] Since 2015, the procedure of involvement into labor activities of foreign citizens arriving to the Russian Federation without visas was changed. Except certain groups of foreign citizens, this category of migrants carries on labor activities on the basis of patents. Moreover, pursuant to the Eurasian economic union agreement, citizens of member-states (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan) carry on their labor activities with no permissive documents. This has brought about a considerable decrease of number of work permits issued (-85.7%) including permits for qualified specialists (-86.1%)[13].

During the period under inquiry, 214,559 forms of work permits were processed[14] (the number processed in the similar period of the previous year was 1.5 million). Forms were granted to 177,175 foreign citizens (compared to 1.3 million the previous year).

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[9] The Population of Russia 2010-2011, pp. 481-485
[10] The Population of Russia 2010-2011, p.524
[11] Mukomel 2015
[12] FMS 2015. p. 15
[13] ibid.
[14] Including skilled, highly qualified specialists and foreign citizens who get the higher education on full attendance basis in the Russian Federation.

In the process of work permit execution, the principal vocations designated by females were specialists, seamstresses, managers, auxiliary workers, masseuses, and cooks. Male labor migrants were given permits as brick-layers, specialists, plasterers, concrete layers, auxiliary workers, steel fixers, and carpenters.[15]

The process of naturalization has become intensified in recent years, and the number of persons gaining permanent/long-term legal residence in Russia has increased. Whereas in 2011, 275,000 people acquired Russian citizenship by 2015 the figure had risen to 526,000; the number of those who received temporary residence also increased from 135,000 to 210,000.[16]

It should be noted that the structure of foreign labor force involved in Russia by different sectors of employment did not change considerably in these years. Labor migration has become a structural component of the Russian economy and the condition of its successful development and functioning. As our studies have shown, the Russian labor market demonstrated models of migrant employment typical for recipient countries. As a rule, migrants work in the spheres of labor that are unattractive for the indigenous population: in trade, construction, transport. Gender segregation of workers is apparent. However, there are many examples of migrants working in other spheres of employment. For instance, according to experts, migrants from Armenia work in the sphere of science, culture, housing and utilities infrastructure, and are engaged in small and medium businesses, public services (shoe cobbling and watch repair), while those from Georgia are involved in cab-driving, restaurant and gambling business, cultural and entertainment and leisure activities. In comparison with migrants from Central Asia, migrants from Armenia and Georgia have higher level of education and more diversification of employment. 7.7% of Armenian migrants and 16.3% of Georgians have established their own firms.[17]

As a rule, a migrant chooses for employment a sector of the Russian economy to some extent corresponds to their previous experience, but the choice must meet with the needs of the Russian market. Our study also bears witness to the prevalence of unofficial channels and informal ties that migrants use in their job search and employment. There is a lack of system of employment for migrants from the CIS countries and no support in countries of previous residence as well as the obvious inadequacy of information required for making decisions related to moving to Russia and legalization on the Russian labor market. To a considerable extent, the type of employment or business is determined not only by previous experience, but by possibilities provided by friends and relatives' as well as personal initiative. That said, independent job search by many migrants does not exclude reliance on networks during the initial arrangement and adaptation period, and simply confirms the high potential of the Russian labor market.

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[15] FMS 2015, p. 15.
[16] ibid.
[17] Osadchaya 2013

Change of place of residence and necessity to adapt to the new labor market bring about a situation where migrants' educational potential is not always used in the labor activity. At the same time, despite a change of work profiles, the overwhelming majority (9 out of 10) of employed migrants are satisfied with their jobs in general, while the real employment of migrants provides them and their families with relatively high incomes that are quite comparable with indicators of average incomes in regions where the migrants live and work.

3. Stages of Russia's migration policy changes in 1991-2015

Experts involved in our study[18] distinguished five stages of Russian migration policy transformation.

The first stage: migration policy pursued from 1991 to August of 1994 as the response to challenges of massive forced migration. According to expert appraisal, after the disintegration of the USSR, collapsed governance and management and the consequent vacuum of law led for the first time to the problem of mass forced immigration. The quantity of migrants coming into Russia in the early 1990s from the CIS countries did not differ much that of the mid-1980s. It was, however, the problem of refugees and forced migrants that necessitated the definition of a new state policy in the sphere of migration, to develop laws in line with these changes. The Federal Migration Service created in 1992 was forced to go to engage in the development of legislation, migration programs and organization of reception and accommodation of forced migrants, information support and many other things, including those alien to the service (for instance, housing construction).[19] Russia joined the Protocol of Convention on Status of Refugees (July 28, 1951), which came into effect on February 1, 1993, (Decree of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation # 3876 of November 13, 1992). The Federal Law # 4528-I "On refugees" came into effect on February 19, 1993.[20]

The second stage: August, 1994 – May, 2000. This was the stage when the legislation was improved. In particular, aims and targets of migration policy were specified.

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[18] "Migration from Armenia and Georgia in Moscow: comparative analysis" project (*Volkswagen grant)*. 25 experts representing bodies of power, the Federal Migration Service, public and non-governmental organizations and academic community have been polled. Interviews were held in period from February 1, 2009, to April 30, 2009, with the aim to identify problems of migration. Selection of experts was done by method of formalized selection and by snowball method. Expert composition included 3 representatives of authorities, 3 representatives of the Federal Migration Service, 4 representatives of non-governmental organizations and 15 representatives of academic community. Officials engaged in problems of migration, chiefs and leading specialists of the Federal Migration Service Directorate for Moscow city, representatives of non-governmental organizations that unite migrants, scientific and public councils developing migration policy of Russia; a journalist from "Migration" newspaper and scientists' investigation migration processes in Moscow and Russia.

[19] Mukomel 2015

[20] Federal law 1993

According to the experts, a harmonious system of legal bases, organizational accompaniment, instruments of implementation and migration policy funding was established in 1994. However, in subsequent years, up to May 2000, no new fundamental laws were passed. The existing legislation was smoothed and polished, primarily with respect to two categories of migrants: forced immigrants and refugees. Two basic laws, "On forced immigrants" (in version of the Federal Law # 202 of December 20, 1995) and "On refugees" (in version of the Federal Law # 95 of June 28, 1997) were subject to important modifications, and this constituted a considerable breakthrough in comparison with laws passed in 1993. Amendments specifying provisions on the Russian Federation citizen's passport, and on the transit through the territory of Russia were introduced into the Law "On procedure of departure and entry". Immigration began to decline from 1995, partly due to the inability of the state to fulfill the obligations to immigrants declared in the laws.

The third stage: May, 2000 – February, 2002. This was the time of reorganization of the Federal Migration Service, and of transition to a power-orientated approach in solving migration problems. According to experts, the work of the migration agency was in fact paralyzed in these two years, thanks to a series of reorganizations that brought about the principal change of priorities in the Federal Migration Service activities.

The fourth stage: March, 2002 – January, 2007. This period saw the triumph of the power-oriented approach, aimed at "closing of the country" and restriction of migration inflow. On February 23, 2002, the Migration Service became an integral part of the force agency, with all positive and negative consequences. Issues of registration and control became priority issues for the Service and the struggle against illegal migration which is one of the principal directions of its activity. At this stage the Federal Law of the Russian Federation # 115-ФЗ "On the legal status of foreign citizens" of July 25, 2002, was passed. This law defined legal status of foreign citizens in the Russian Federation and laid down the bases of regulation of relations between foreign citizens, and also of bodies of local self-government and of conflicts that emerged in connection with foreign citizens staying in Russia and the exercise of labor, entrepreneurship and other activities by foreign citizens.

Next year, in 2003, the Conception of Migration Processes regulation was passed, attesting to the desire to define and mark general priorities of migration policy, to assert the state position in this sphere and to regularize its legal and normative basis. The Conception became a guide for the implementation of Russian migration policy, the main principles of which were the protection of human rights and freedoms on the basis of legality and firm observation of the international law norms, the protection of national interests, and the provision of security for the Russian Federation. The migration card was introduced for monitoring migration flows affecting the Russian Federation and bringing the illegal foreign labor force out from anonymity.

The Russian Federation Federal Law 110-ФЗ of July 17, 2006, "On migration registration of foreign citizens and stateless persons," simplifying the registration of foreign citizens, was one of the most important ones passed in this period. According to experts, the law, with amendments introduced in the Law "On legal status of foreign citizens in the Russian Federation," represents fundamentally new migration legislation. Experts claim that results of the first year of the law implementation reveal an impressive positive effect. It was noted in the national report "On development of human potential in the Russian Federation in 2008: Russia in the face of demographic challenges,"[21] thanks to which authentic data on the total number of immigrants were obtained for the first, including the number of labor migrants. The level of temporary labor migrants increased, which in turn contributed to improvement of migrants' human rights and labor rights protection. Situation changed radically so that where earlier some 46% of migrants were unregistered, after adoption of the Law and amendments to other laws this figure dropped to only 15%. The overwhelming majority of migrants (85%) acquired registration and came out from the shadows. The situation with migrants' work permits also changed radically. According to data of monitoring performed by the International Migration Organization and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, in 2007, 75% of labor migrants executed work permits while earlier only 15-25% of migrants (according to data of various studies) had been hired by employers who had relevant licenses. However, the same report noted that the new procedure of issue of work permits to migrants once again emphasized the dual nature of the Russian labor market, and the existence of enormous possibilities for shadow employment in this market. Approximately 40% of migrants who got work permits were hired informally by employer's eager to avoid taxes. An absolutely legal migrant who abided by all formal requirements of legitimization might nevertheless to be an illegal worker. Moreover, such a migrant worker might be unaware whether the contract he/she signed proved to be genuine or not.

The fifth stage: January, 2007 – April, 2009. In this period a course was taken towards the liberalization of migration policy. The new Federal Law "On migration registration of foreign citizens and stateless persons in the Russian Federation" was passed, basing registration of foreign citizens on notification (previously registration was permissive). Cardinal amendments to the Federal Law "On legal status of foreign citizens in the Russian Federation" were also introduced to make employment of those from the CIS countries considerably easier, and the first steps to attract fellow nationals to Russia were taken. However, as experts noted, attempts to realize liberal approaches to the full failed. Migration policy at that moment was a situational, not a long-term policy, which consisted of the whole mixture of internal contradictions and lacked even a clearly-worded strategy. According to experts, only a weak attempt at legislative regulation of migration processes was undertaken, which was far from protecting national interests. The main aim was to establish control over employers' activity and give a fine in case of illegal activity. Indeed, at that moment there was no concept of migration policy in Russia and

[21] Report on human development 2008

the very national legislation did not fully take international experience into account. The Russian Federation at that moment had not signed the UN Conventions or joined the International Labor Organization because it was not ready to fulfill requirements of international organizations either at legal or practical level. As the experts noted, the requirements of international organizations could comprise of the basis of development of effective laws, and of interstate relations.

Some experts noted that attention to issues of migration, particularly illegal forms of migration, grew in Russia. The opening of a center for legal entities and individuals legal servicing on labor migration issues in Moscow was mentioned as one of examples of this growing attention. The Center was created on the basis of a unit Federal Migration Service Directorate for Moscow city. In plans of the Federal Migration Service, chiefs were given the task to create such centers all over Russia. According to Constantine Romodanovski such a mechanism would exclude corruption in the provinces, ensuring the complete control of state fee payment. As creators of the Center explain, this would deprive officials of their shadow incomes. It is the expert community's opinion that the Russian leadership at this stage realized the need for a more liberal policy, particularly in the sphere of labor migration, and started work on the formation of such policy. Besides this, individual measures of migrant integration were undertaken. Experts think that the most remarkable directions of such efforts are Russian language learning, and dissemination of information for migrants. Fellow nationals who come within frameworks of the State program of voluntary resettlement (the program was established in 2007) also receive assistance in integration.[22] Additionally, some experts noted the severe lack of attention to issues of social adaptation and integration of migrants into new social context. Most commented that there was virtually no policy of migrant integration. Understanding who should be integrated and how was also lacking. Moreover, there is no one has power responsible for integration of migrants. One expert argued that the policy of Moscow city government in respect of migrants is a restrictive one aimed at stiffening of conditions, increase of taxes, and state expenditure reduction against background of the Russian policy liberalization.[23] True, several experts noted that the government of the capital city still encourages immigration of certain categories of migrants, for example, migrants from Tajikistan, and does not hinder migration that is carried on within the limits of laws and rules of migration to the territory of the Russian Federation. Another expert noted that Moscow city tried to do something in this direction but its integration policy was based on obsolete opinions on migration. Appraising position of the Russian Government on issues of migration most experts were inclined to ambiguous appreciation: [The Government] encourages migration and at the same time impedes it". Some asserted that the Government did not hinder migration occurring within the limits of laws and rules of migration to the territory of the Russian Federation.

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[22] The state program 2006; The decree of the President 2012
[23] Osadchaya, Yudina 2009.

As I.V. Ivakhnyuk, a member of the Government commission on migration policy, noted, the sixth stage of migration policy began in 2010.[24] Ivakhnyuk defined this stage as the stage of migration policy sophistication. First, this stage is distinguished by a course towards systemic migration policy. Second, renewal of normative basis is specific for this new stage. Third, the differentiated approach to various categories of migrants is defined. Finally, formation of migration channels for foreign workers and stiffening of requirements migrants have to comply with in the process of legal status acquisition have been started.

Thus, for instance, preferences given to specialists of high proficiency in accordance with the Federal Law #86-ФЗ passed in May 19, 2010, are of importance. These preferences encompass the following positions: work permit is issued for the term of labor contract, i.e. up to three years, and can be extended; work permit can be effective in territories of several constituent parts of the Russian Federation; highly skilled specialists and members of their families can acquire permits for residence in the Russian Federation; multiple labor visa effective up to three years is introduced; income tax rate for migrants is reduced from 30% to 13%; quotas for highly skilled specialists are repealed.

The principal document of this stage was the Conception of state migration policy, which was adopted on May 13, 2012.[25] The Conception defined the tasks, principles, targets and mechanisms of state migration policy implementation. The tasks are the provision of national security, maximum protection, comfort and well-being of the population of Russia, stabilization and increase of resident population size, contribution to provision of the Russian economy requirement in labor force, to modernization, innovative development and enhancement of the competitiveness of its branches. The targets are numerous and include the creation of conditions and incentives for resettlement to the Russian Federation and for permanent residence for fellow nationals who reside abroad, emigrants and certain categories of foreign citizens; development of differentiated mechanisms of attraction, selection and use of foreign labor force; assistance to the development of internal migration; assistance to educational migration and the support of academic mobility; fulfillment of humanitarian obligations in respect to forced migrants; assistance for the integration of migrants, to formation of constructive interaction between migrants and the recipient community, and suppression of illegal migration.

Three stages of the state migration policy of the Russian Federation can be determined: the first between 2012 and 2015, the second between 2016 and 2020, and the third between 2021 and 2025. It may seem to be that the adoption of the Conception put the full stop in the violent discussions on perspectives and role of migration in development of Russia. Nevertheless as V. I. Mukomel rightly points out, the reversibility of politics still remains, and innovations legislators introduce into laws and practices of their

[24] Ivakhnyuk 2016
[25] The concept of State migration policy of the Russian Federation for the period until 2025

implementation often come into conflict with declared tasks and targets.[26] The Decree of the President of the Russian Federation # 156 of April 5, 2016, on the abolition of the Federal Migration Service confirms these words, as the functions and authority of the Federal Migration Service are devolved to the Ministry of the Interior again.[27] It can be said that one more stage will start from April of 2016. So far experts have found it difficult to appraise the consequences of this decision.

4. Migration processes in the Eurasian Economic Union (the EAEU)

The treaty on creation of the Eurasian Economic Union (hereinafter referred to as the EAEU), which came into effect on January 1, 2015, guarantees freedom of labor force movement and creates conditions favorable for activation of migration processes within the confines of the new integration expanse.

A choice is open for citizens in which country of the EAEU they will work. States-members of the EAEU do not establish or apply restrictions set up in their national legislations for the protection of their domestic labor market with respect to citizens of member states of the Union. At the same time, in the process of employment in the country- member of the Union are accepted: certificates of education issued by educational organizations of member-states, without education certificates recognition procedures established by national legislations. Exceptions are made only with respect to pedagogical, legal, medical and pharmaceutical activities.

Non-visa entry, lack of custom checks and quotas for jobs, the existence of a basic set of measures of health and social insurance, and the possibility of getting education in any member-country are doubtless advantages of the EAEU. These advantages contribute to civilized construction of the modern creative society in the EAEU.

However new possibilities of labor force movement in the EAEU that became effective in 2015 did not have a major impact on the migration situation in its member countries.

Despite the fact that in 2015 the migration increment in Russia declined by 12.3% in comparison with 2014, the vector of migration connected with resettlement for permanent residence as well as with labor migration was still directed from the EAEU member states to Russia, while migration outflow continued in Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.[28] The migration increment of the population in Belarus by 17.6% is also not related with new freedoms of the EAEU market. The number of labor migrants coming to Belarus from the EAEU countries, Russia and Kazakhstan in particular, has fallen. While more than 4500 Russian citizens and over 1000 Kazakh citizens came to the

[26] Mukomel 2015
[27] The decree of the President 2016
[28] Express information EEC 2016.

Republic of Belarus in 2014, in the first half of 2015 it was only 700 Russians and 250 Kazakhs.[29]

Table 3.
International migration of population, January-December, 2015, persons

Country	In migration	Out migration	Migration Increase (decrease)
Armenia	19 500	45 400	-25 900
Belarus	28 349	9 855	18 494
Kazakhstan	16 670	30 080	-13 410
Kyrgyzstan	3 559	7 785	-4 226
Russia	598 793	352 864	245 929

Source: Express information of EEC, 2016. Estimate based on results of the Integrated survey of household conditions of living.

According to official data, the number of foreign citizens from countries that joined the EAEU increased by 135,828 in comparison with January 2015, and as of January 2016 the figure totaled nearly 2.3 million. In the past two years the total number of citizens of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan living in Russia grew, while number of Armenians fluctuated around 450,000.[30] Indeed, as experts note, the last months of 2015, after Kyrgyzstan joined the EAEU in August of 2015, a considerable growth of labor migrants from there was observed. In December alone, this inflow increased by 2%.[31]

Table 4
Total number of foreigners staying in Russia (persons)

№	Country	January 2014	January 2015	January 2016
1.	Armenia	435,661	480,017	467,450
2.	Kazakhstan	571,527	597,559	636,005
3.	Belarus	390,564	517,828	618,823
4.	Kyrgyzstan	524,877	544,956	553,910
Total		1,922,629	2,140,360	2,276,188

Source: Opalev, Myazina 2015

Indicators of migration activity will probably change in 2016 for number of registered unemployed people, which compared to November of 2014, rose by 16.9% in Armenia, 79.1% in Belarus, 3.7% in Kazakhstan, and 12.5% in Russia, and declined by 3.8% only in Kyrgyzstan.[32] According to the ILO procedure, in December 2015 unemployment

[29] Number of labor migrants from China 2016
[30] Opalev, Myazina 2015.
[31] East Time 2016
[32] Express information EEC 2016.

in the EAEU as a whole comprised 5.7% of the economically active population, while the respective figures for Kazakhstan and Russia are 5.0% and 5.8%. In Armenia in the third quarter of 2015, unemployment level comprised 16.6%. According to the ILO criteria to the 2009 census data, unemployment level comprised, in accordance with the ILO criteria. According to the 2009 census data, unemployment according to ILO criteria comprised 6.1%. In 2014 in Kyrgyzstan level of unemployment was 8.0%. For comparison, in November 2015 unemployment in the European Union was 9.1%, and in December 2015 in the USA it was 5.0%.[33]

The main factors inhibiting migration were global financial and economic turbulence, the high volatility of exchange rates, and anti-Russian sanctions. The changing exchange rate of the ruble to the US dollar had a negative impact on the attractiveness of spatial mobility. Conclusions of Armenian experts that private transfers feeding the Armenian economy dropped drastically are an indirect confirmation of this assertion. The total decline comprised 30.1%, while the amount of transfers from Russia (87% of total transfers to Armenia) declined by 36.1% last year.[34]

The incomplete development of normative and legal regulation can be attributed to the problems of migration processes in the EAEU. The development of a normative and legal basis for retirement insurance of workers of member-states is still in progress. The same is true of standardization of member-states' legislation in the sphere of labor migration. Realization of agreements achieved on common terms of taxes on incomes of member-states' individual persons from the first days of hired work also requires attention. The practical implementation of legislation assuring workers' children right to attend preschool, school and university remains incomplete. Issues of migrants' legal rights and problems of migrants' labor activity also remain unsolved. Thus, according to the assessment of A. Asanbaev, deputy chief of the State Migration Service of Kyrgyzstan, about 100,000 natives of Kyrgyzstan who came to Russia before Kyrgyzstan joined the EAEU are residing illegally.[35] Experts think that in spite of indulgences and simplification of permits issuing process, many Kyrgyz prefer to "stay in shadow".[36] Experts from Armenia also spoke of problems of labor migrants who came to Russia prior to Armenia joining the EAEU.

Free labour activities in any state of EAEU are only possible if the population of the host society supports labor migration to their country. According to our research 32.0% to 52% of the Russians respondents – "do not support" and " rather do not support" the labor migration within the Eurasian Union (see Table 5.). Migration is thus in their view the cause of a crime wave, and of interethnic and social tensions in the country. The respondents believe that the attraction of a significant number of labor migrants to their

[33] Unemployment in the Eurasian Eeconomic Union 2016.
[34] Armenia's economy 2015
[35] Number of Kyrgyz migrants 2016.
[36] Baktygulov 2016

regions can lead to the complication of the ethno-cultural and ethno-social diversity that can create security threats. Migration, according to their opinion, is the reason for the rise of crimes, ethnic and social tensions in the country.

Table 5
Do you support labor migration within the EAEU confines[37]

(Percentage of the people polled)

	Yes	**Rather support**	**Rather do not support**	**No**	**Difficult to say**
From Belarus to Russia?	27	33	16	16	7
	60		**32**		
From Armenia to Russia?	19	30	21	22	8
	49		**43**		
From Kazakhstan to Russia?	18	30	22	22	8
	48		**44**		
From Kyrgyzstan to Russia?	15	29	23	25	8
	44		**48**		
From Tajikistan to Russia?	14	25	23	29	10
	39		**52**		

Source: see footnote no. 37

The results of polling migrants from the EAEU member-countries confirm this conclusion (the poll was carried out in Moscow in summer 2015[38]). The share of those who are dissatisfied with their jobs and housing conditions and do not have health insurance in Moscow, is higher among those from Kyrgyzstan. Such dissatisfied migrants note the unfriendly or hostile attitude of Muscovites and authorities to migrants, and feel

[37] The poll was carried out in February of 2016 within the limits of the State Task to the Russian academy of the Russian Academy of sciences on «Social-political dimension of the Eurasian integration» (The chief of the project is G. I. Osadchaya. Registration number: 115071470024). The sample represents urban and rural population of 18 years and older. All in all 1500 persons, males and females who permanently reside in Russia in nine Federal circuits, 41 constituent parts of the Russian Federation, 105 settlements were polled. Sample error is ~+-2,6%.

[38] The poll was carried out in June of 2015 within the limits of «Migrants from the EAEU member-states at Moscow labor market (Chiefs of the project are G. I. Osadchaya and T. N. Yudina). 100 migrants from each of the following countries: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) selected by random selection and by method of snowball on the basis of the single characteristic, arrival to Moscow after 2000 were polled.

discomfort during their stay in Moscow more often than migrants from other countries of the EAEU. The possible reasons of this dissatisfaction are the poor command of Russian of Kyrgyz natives and their lesser preparedness for life in a big city, in comparison with Armenians, Belorussians, and Kazakhs.

Opening the borders of the EAEU countries creates risks of an excessive inflow of labor and non-labor migrants, as well as criminal and extremist elements disguised as labor migrants from countries that are not members of the EAEU. In connection with this, joint actions aimed at protection of EAEU borders, coordination of border policies and the EAEU legal basis related to migration problem acquire a particular importance.

The careful elaboration of issues related to the common system of education and vocational training is also important for the effective use of labor migration as a resource. Taking into account the main vector of migration flows from countries-members of the EAEU (towards Russia) additional measures aimed at improvement of Russian language command are needed.

Appropriate social, economic and cultural conditions for the adaptation of newcomers should be created, and a positive attitude to idea of integration should also be formed. It is important to cultivate ethno-complementary relations, and tolerance to various groups of population, so as to prevent inter-ethnic conflict. All member countries of the EAEU need to develop mechanisms of self-regulation in the sphere of labor migration at regional level.

The program of media support for the Eurasian integration project is also very important. This program may include information on advantages of integration, reinforced with real activities and positive information about neighbors in the Union, on the basis of the up-to-date methods and instruments of information promotion of ideas: social networks, expert community, education, etc. The EAEU needs the support of media, the academic community and society as a whole.

The monitoring of the processes of the formation of a common labor market and the free movement of labor within the new integrated union will help in an adequate assessment of the effectiveness of the integration process and also to evaluate the dynamics of the transformation changes. Appraisals given by population and experts can become arguments for policy and justify the development of social strategies and social programs.

5. Summary and conclusions

Migration processes in Russia are reflections of social movement, and a response to the requirements of the national economy. As it is the most important condition of demographic potential maintenance and social-economic development in Russia, migration accumulates virtually all types (resettlement, seasonal, push-pull, episodic migration) and categories (economic, forced, family, educational etc.) in the form of

both in- and out-migration. The specifics are dictated by many factors including geographic selectivity, increases in labor capacity and supply, temporary and illegal migrants, resettlement of migrants working in megacities and cities, in their suburbs, interstate relations and the urge of capital city authorities for restrictive migration policy.

In the past 20 years, Russian migration policy ran the gamut from migration unregulated by the state in the 1990s, to strictly restrictive migration policy of the 2000s, to partial liberalization in 2007, and again to attempts of its tightening with the global crisis. Experts indicate that the present-day migration policy of Russia is short-term rather than long-term, and note that it lacks a clearly articulated strategy. In their view, it is a weak attempt at the legislative regulation of migration processes, and at present is still far from protecting national interests. The main directions of the current Russian migration are control of entrepreneurs' activities and imposition of penalties on illegal migrants.

Experts also note that the migration policy of the 1990s was the most successful; a policy that was characterized by "advanced migration practices and built on principles of humanism".[39] Precisely this policy made it possible to address the problems of forced migrant reception successfully in that period. Thereafter, from 2010 onward, policy was tightened and this enhanced corruption and impeded effective reception and settlement of refugees from Ukraine in 2014-2015.

The present-day migration policy has no clear-cut model of integration (assimilation and multicultural models), although it is accepted by the population and the Government of the Russian Federation.

New determinants of labor market formation in Russia are connected with refugees from Ukraine, and the freedom of labor movement within the confines of the new integration expanse that is the Eurasian Economic Union. This ultimately requires the effective use of instruments of migration policy and the humanization of migration policy.

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[39] Postavnin 2016

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OLENA MALYNOVSKA

MIGRATION TRENDS IN UKRAINE IN THE CONTEXT OF CIVILIZATIONAL CHOICE

The social, economic, and societal change during the last 25 years, after the collapse of the USSR when Ukraine gained its independence, constituted a major challenge for the country's population. Patterns and directions of migration flows have also been transformed. Population movement has been affecting and influencing the demographic, economic and political development of Ukraine.

It has taken a considerable effort from the society to overcome the experience of the Soviet past and to gradually move towards European standards of democracy and the rule of law. The struggle around the civilizational choice of Ukraine has resulted in the revolutionary events in winter 2013-2014, and was followed by the Russian aggression. These events could be seen as the migration experience gained by Ukrainians during the years of independence. After overcoming the 'autarky' of the Soviet times and obtaining the right to free movement, hundreds of thousands of civilians could go abroad and gain their education and working experience, as well as experience the advantages of democracy and market economy shaping their life values.

The evolution of the migration processes of the past 25 years has no linear direction. In different times, direction and nature of migration processes have been somewhat various. Moreover, trends have been also interrelated with the stages of change in the migration policy of Ukraine.

1. Migration processes during the first years of independence

Migration processes of the independent Ukraine can be structured around four different stages. In the first stage (1991-93) primarily political drivers influenced the migration flows, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union and the beginning of building the independent state.

Inflow of migrants was substantially larger than the outflow of population in these times, with cca. 1.5 millions of people moving to Ukraine between 1991 and 1993,

resulting in a half a million of net migration[1]. At that time, the population of Ukraine continued to grow in spite of the natural decrease.

In most cases this was due to the return of Ukrainian immigrants from the North of Russia, Western and Eastern Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia, choosing their country of origin for living. Between 1991 and 1993 about half of the migrants from Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan were ethnic Ukrainians, as well as 54% of migrants from Turkmenistan, and 60% from the Baltic countries. Repatriation became the main factor behind the rise in the share of Ukrainians in the population of the country: it was 72.7% according to the census of 1989, and 77.8% by the first Ukrainian census in 2001[2].

During the democratic transformation victims of repression and deportation of the Soviet time could return to their homeland. As a result, 7% of migrants were Crimean Tatars and their descendants, deported in 1944 during the Stalin regime. 88.5 thousand returned only between 1991 and 1993. According to census data in 2001 about 248 thousand ethnic Crimean Tatars were living in Crimea, 5.3 times more than at the time of the Soviet census in 1989.

Mass repatriation of the early 1990s was in large a result of political tension and armed conflicts in many former Soviet republics. In 1992, Ukraine accommodated more than 60 thousand refugees from the zone of military activities in Transnistria. In 1993, local authorities have provided help for 14 thousands refugees coming from different countries of the CIS.[3] It was not only ethnic Ukrainians to become forced migrants or refugees, but also the titular population of the conflict zones in fSU countries. In part due to the Armenian-Azerbaijani war the number of Armenian and Azerbaijani migrants increased, while the armed conflict in Abkhazia (Republic of Georgia) contributed to the inflow of Georgians. The 2001 census witnessed a 20% growth in the number of Azerbaijani migrants in Ukraine (45.2 thousand), while approximatly 1.5 times more Georgians (34.2 thousand), and 1.8 times more Armenians (99.9 thousand) with respect to the census in 1989.

Emigration from Ukraine was also driven by the return to the historical homeland of some ethnic groups. Russians were dominant in this respect (about 50% of all emigrants that left Ukraine to the former republics of the USSR). Repatriation of other titular ethnic minorities that got their independent states after the dissolution of USSR was also intense (apart from those states that faced armed conflicts).

Ethnicity played an important role in the movement towards non-former Soviet countries. Most of the emigrants were ethnic Jews heading to Israel (44 thousand persons got official

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[1] Here and later the article relies on the flow data on migration collected by the State Statistical Services of Ukraine based on information on registration (and cancellation of registration) of people living more than 6 months at a given place of residence.

[2] Nacionalnlii sklad 2003

[3] Svodnyi doklad po stranam 1996

Permits for Departure in 1992, and 47 thousand in 1993). The exodus of ethnic Germans (during the 1990s about 40 thousand emigrants of German origin and their families[4]), and Greeks[5] (about 15 thousand people emigrated to Greece) was also significant.

2. The end of the 1990s – beginning of the 2000s

The wave of repatriation evoked by the collapse of the USSR did not last long. By the mid-nineties the push factors of forced migration have faded. Ukraine had lost its attractiveness for immigrants due to its deep economic recession. The severe economic situation drove a number of Ukrainian citizens to earn their living in foreign countries, in Russia at the first place, where economic perspectives were more favorable. The second phase, from 1994 to 2004, brought a negative migration balance according to official migration data, with an outflow of slightly more than 700 thousand people in a decade. At the same time, the Ukrainian census in 2001 has claimed that the real loss (net migration) of Ukraine was 1.7 times larger in the1990s, than suggested by the official statistics.[6] The reason is that the rigorous rule on registration at the place of residence *(propiska)* has been abolished by the right to free movement. Moreover, movement of citizens is reportedly underestimated, as statistics reflect the official registrations' records by place of residence.

Democratization of social life has erased political, ethnic, religious motives forforced migration, as well as reasons for application for a refugee status in the West. Furthermore, the source for ethnic repatriation migration has shrunk. Economic problems challenged all population regardless their ethnicities, and emigration reflected rather the national structure of the population. Jews represented a minority within the emigrants to Israel: 57% of those emigrated from Ukraine in 1995, 30% in 1999, and 16.6% in 2005. Current statistics does not collect data on nationality of migrants.

The replacement of ethnic and political reasons by economic considerations leads to substantially shrinking numbers of emigrants leaving for resettlement (328 thousand people left Ukraine in 1994, while in 2004 just 46 thousand, or less than one seventh). Meanwhile short-term and circular migration for work has spread as a main movement pattern.

While in 1992 border guard service counted appr. 4.5 million border-crossings from Ukraine annually, in the late nineties this number reached 15-16 million Ukrainian citizens annually. The opportunity of free visa regime in the context of a deep economic crisis fueled labor migration among the population and became the main reason instead of tourism or recreation purposes.

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[4] Deitz 1996
[5] Kaurinkovski 2008
[6] Kompleksne demografichne doslidzhennia v Ukraini 2005

The first economic migration was related to petty-trade activities *(by chelnoki)*, thus cross-border transportation of small-scale goods 'in hands'. Traders sold Ukranian produced goods abroad, and for the earned money purchased mass products that they sold in Ukraine. Income was generated from the price and exchange rate gaps.

As trade and personal contacts had been established and experience had accumulated by time, Ukrainians also entered the labor market of the target countries and organized long-term employment with a higher and more reliable income. By the beginning of the 21st century outward labor migration has turned into a mass migration flow with more than 10% of the labor force[7] of Ukraine, or about 3 million people, with a substantial social impact. Target countries of Ukrainian labor migration were Russia, Poland, and the Czech Republic, a substantial flow went further toward the Southern countries of Europe, such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece. Men worked mainly in the construction industry, and women were employed for in domestic work.

The labor migration flow had a semi-illegal character. The border crossing was legal (due to the visa-free regime with the neighboring countries, while outward movement toward further countries was possible with short-term tourist visas), but in most of the cases Ukrainians were employed in the shadow economy without obtaining the necessary permits.

3. Migration before the global financial crisis

The third phase of migration processes can be dated from 2005 until the beginning of the global financial crisis. Ukrainian statistics suggest that migration flow has stabilized on a rather low level at that time. Outward flow has fallen. According to the annual social data reported of the Institute for Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, aspirations to leave were the lowest in 2008 among Ukrainians: slightly more than 15% expressed their willingness to go abroad among those who wanted to change their residence, in contrast to the 1990s, when almost 25% of the respondents aspired to leave.[8]

This figure reflected a revitalisation and development of Ukranian economy of those times. The population has also adapted to the new life conditions that resulted in a decrease of emigration, and a slightly growing immigration, as many migrants have returned. Net migration showed a slightly positive rate at that time.

The volume of temporary outward migration shrunk. The poll on labor migration of the Ukrainian population (covering 22 thousand households with 48 thousand people of working age) by the State Statistics Service of Ukraine in 2008 found that in the

[7] Doslidzhennia u sferi trudovoi migratsii 2005
[8] Ukrainske suspilstvo 1992-2010

previous three and a half years, between 2005 and mid-2008, 1.5 million Ukrainians, or 5.1% of the labor force have left at least once for working abroad[9]. This figure covered those who have leaved the country, stayed abroad, paid a visit within the above period to Ukraine, and later returned to their former job.

Returning back home, some labor migrants successfully found jobs, or launched their business in Ukraine based on their remittance savings. Research conducted by the European Training Foundation in 2007 found that about 3.2% of the population is returned migrant.[10] As labor force constituted about 30 millions, returnees were around 1 million.

Meanwhile for a large share of the population working abroad became the basic source of living and income. The State Statistics Service found in 2008 that labor migration was mainly temporary. In average during 3.5 years each migrant went abroad 3.5 times for a job, where the average time of stay was 7 months. For short-term visits popular targets were Hungary (64.7%), Poland (62.5%), Russia (47.2%) and the Czech Republic (38.6%).[11]

Despite the shrinking emigration, target countries registered a larger number of arrivals from Ukraine, than the Ukrainian statistics on outward movement. Based on this, data calculations of the Population Department of the UN suggested that external net migration of the Ukrainian population remained negative, however with a substantially lower value than in the 1990s. In average it constituted minus 35 thousand people annually between 2000-2005, and minus 16 thousand between 2006-2010.[12] Family reunification and migratory networks formed by the extensive labor migration fostered emigration. Legal conditions of many Ukrainians working abroad were regulated in the target countries partly due to migration amnesty, namely in Portugal, Italy, Spain, Greece, which improved their living conditions and provided access for better-paid and more valued jobs, and gave opportunities for family reunification, gaining property, etc. Despite the expressed aspirations to return back toUkraine, these migrants found themselves residing permanently in the target countries.

4. Migration and the crisis

The fourth phase started around 2009-2010 and lasts up until now. This period has seen migration within the context of the crisis. The global economic and financial crisis shook the Ukrainian economy, even though it happened later than in the developed countries. Economic growth failed to catch up since. War and aggression deepened the

[9] Zovnishnia trudova migratsiia naselennia Ukrainy 2009
[10] European Trainig Foundation 2008
[11] Zovnishnia trudova migratsiia naselennia Ukrainy 2009
[12] UN Population division

economic crisis, bringing about a sharp decline in the living conditions of the population. In 2012-2013 GDP growth stalled, while in 2014 it dropped by 6.6%, and in 2015 by further 9.9% in comparison to previous year. The average income in 2014 and 2015 decreased by 6.6% and by 21.1%, respectively, based on the previous year. Meanwhile unemployment raised up to 7.3% (methodology of ILO) in 2014, and 9% in 2015, while among the young population below 25 years it was 21.8%. In 2013 commodity prices grew only by 0.5%, while in 2014 by 24.9% and in 2015 by 43.3%.

Though official statistics were continually showing some positive net migration, it was basically due to foreigners, mostly the growing number of foreign students (in 2013/2014 about 70 thousand students pursued their studies in Ukraine, in contrast to the 17 thousand in 2002/2003), while for Ukrainian citizens net migration remained negative. The unfavorable political, military and economic conditions of the past years lead to a growing emigration. This is also suggested by the official statistics, however outflow has always been significantly underestimated, and under the conditions of war and loss of control over a given territory these data call for cautious interpretation. However, information on official resettlement abroad (by cancellation of registration at place of residence due to going abroad) suggests that in 2012 about 14.5 thousand people left Ukraine forever. In 2014, there were 21.6 thousandssuch people, and in 2015 the figure was 21.4 thousands such.

Along with migration triggered by economic challenges, forced migration occurred from the territories of the armed conflict. According to official data of the government, by 4th April 2016 from the temporarily occupied territories and regions of antiterrorist operations, 1,028,828 people have moved toward other regions of the country. From these people 1,006,682 came from the Doneck and Luhansk regions, 22,146 from the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol city. Among them 69,340 were children and 498,632 people had disabilities or were in older age.[13]

In spite of the fact that the main movements of forced migrants have taken place within the borders of the country, Ukrainian refugees can be found abroad as well. According to the data of Eurostat, the amount of asylum applications handed in by Ukrainian citizens in the EU countries was more than 22 thousand in 2015, which is by one third higher than in 2014, and twenty times higher than in 2013. So, 4,685 applications for asylum were submitted in Italy, 4,660 in Germany, 3,345 in Spain, 2,295 in Poland. Besides, only 415 asylum-seekers were granted status in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 1951, and 1,150 people have been granted a subsidiary form of protection based on humanitarian considerations.[14]

Due to the geographical proximity, kinship ties, and pro-Russian orientation of some of the population of Donbas, a significant number of forced migrants left to Russia.

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[13] Mizhidomchii koordinatsiinii shtab povidomliaie 2016
[14] Data source. Eurostat: Asylum and Managed Migration.

According to the Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation, 2.5 million citizens of Ukraine were registered for different motives on the territory of Russia. This implies 1 million more people than as of 1st January 2014.[15] Starting from spring 2014 a number of 6 thousand Ukrainian citizens applied for refugee status, and 403 thousand applied for temporary asylum. There were 273 Ukrainian citizens in 2015 who received refugee status, and 311 thousands who got temporary asylum.[16]

Since the demand for external labor force has shrunk in the countries of destination as a result of the global financial and economic crisis, labor migration from Ukraine has diminished. The crisis, however, did not push Ukranina labour migrants to return home. Firstly, the economic climate of the target countries is still more favorable than that of Ukraine. Secondly, industries where most of the Ukrainians are employed, were less affected by the crisis, namely, domestic work, transport and agriculture.

Labor migration has intensified at the first signs of the economies revitalization in the target countries. The worsening conditions due to the unfolding war in Ukraine have triggered this process. The poll conducted by GFK-Ukraine revealed that 8% of Ukrainians aspired to find or have already found a job abroad. In 2011, the result to this question was only 6%.[17]

Social networks and experience accumulated by labor migration in twenty years has defined the patterns of migration and self-sustaining strategies within the context of the crisis.

Research conducted by the State Statistics Service in 2012 (covering 22 thousand households, where 48 thousand people were of working age) from 1st January 2010 to 17 June 2012, indicated that about 1.2 million citizens between the age of 15 and 70 at least once visited a foreign country. This represented 3.4% of the population of this age.[18] The poll did not cover those who paid their visit abroad before 2010 and did not return to Ukraine during the time of the research. Informants of the research were the relatives of those who left. Thus, migrants that already took their families abroad fell out of the scope of the research. As a consequence, data of the research can be applied only to those labor migrants, who pay visits abroad for temporary employment (the average time spent abroad for employment was 5 months in 2012 and 7 months in 2008), they have a family in Ukraine and pay a visit to their homeland from time to time.

There is another group, those who left Ukraine for employment, but stay there for a longer time and lost their ties to their homeland. Though these people consider themselves as temporary migrants, in fact they are permanent residents. Temporary migration is more

[15] Data source: Svedenia v othonshenii inostrannyh grazhdan
[16] Data source: Oficialyniye statisticheskie Dannie FMS Rossii
[17] Doslidzhennia z pitan migratsii ta torgivli liudmi: Ukraina, 2015 (Research conducted by GfK Ukraine, in March and February 2015, for IOM Ukraine. 2087 persons interviewed in the territory of Ukraine).
[18] Zvit schodo metodologii 2013

prone to turn into a permanent stay in conditions of crisis, as in economic difficulties family reunification is more likely in the target country of the labor migrants. The IOM examining remittances of 2014-2015 found that in 2014 a total of 18.2 thousand people left the country for family reunification abroad.[19]

Arguments regarding the alleged transformation described above are backed by the fact of a reportedly growing number of Ukrainian citizens applying for (temporary and permanent) residence permits abroad. For example according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Poland, the number of permanent residence permits handed in by Ukrainians grew two-folds, and for temporary stay 1.5 times in 2014.[20]

The volume of remittances transferred to Ukraine justifies the trends above. In 2013 remittances have substantially increased and constituted more than 8.5 bln USD according to the calculations of the National Bank of Ukraine. However, in 2014 remittances have fallen by 24% (resulting in 6.5 bln USD). In 2015 remittances continued to drop by 20.5% in respect of the previous year (5.2 bln USD).[21] Despite that, the share of remittances in GDP continued to grow (Figure 1).

A substantial loss of trust in Ukranian financial institutions in times of the crisis is one reason behind diminishing remittances. A further reason might be related to the fact that the number of migrants did not diminish but grew, so shrinking remittances might talk about the shift of the labor migrants' to permanent settlement and life interests abroad. Moreover, in the past years target country polls of labor migrants revealed that their investments into real estate as well as savings were increasingly located abroad, and not in Ukraine.[22]

Figure 1.
Remittances in Ukraine 2007-2015, million USD and % of GDP.



Source National Bank of Ukraine

[19] Migratsiia yak chynnyk rozytku v Ukrainy 2016
[20] Raport na temat obywateli Ukrainy 2015
[21] Ogliad pryvatnih groshovyh perekaziv v Ukrainu 2016
[22] Malynovska 2014

This line of argumentation also suggests that the data of Gosstat (State Statistics Service) from 2012 claiming a shrinking volume of labor migration, is in fact telling about the decline of circular migration. Comparing the data of 2012 and that of a similar research from 2008 suggests further shifts in labor migration from Ukraine. First, geographic destination of migrants has changed: the ratio of those moving to Russia for work has dropped from 48.1% to 43.2%. Meanwhile, the outflow to Poland has grown from 8% to 14.3%.

Other resources also confirm the gradual shift of the direction of migration – the fade of Eastern destinations and the growing flow toward the West. The official statistics of the Russian Federation registered a constant drop of Ukrainians among foreign labor force obtaining work permits in the Russian Federation. In 2000 Ukrainians constituted 30% of foreign labor force, while in 2005 it was 20%, and in 2010 only 10%. In 2012, 160 thousand Ukrainians had a work permit in Russia (in 2008 it was 250 thousand). Among foreigners obtaining a work permit 11% were Ukrainian citizens, while among those who had their work permit from private entities[23] were 3%. The further drop in the number of Ukrainian employees (according to some experts by 20-30%)[24] is also related to the more rigorous legislation on employment of foreigners, introduced in January 2015 when the legislation of Eurasian Union come into force.

Acceleration of migration flow toward the West is due to the hostile relations with Russia, the annexation of Crimea, and the war in Eastern Ukraine. According to the research of GFK Ukraine conducted for IOM in 2015, the number of potential Ukrainian labor migrants with aspirations to find a job in Russia has dropped from 18% in 2011 to 12%. Poland became more attractive for job-seekers willing to leave Ukraine: aspirations of 7% in 2006 were raised to 30% in 2015.[25] These findings are not viable for the population in the occupied territories, where migration to Russia is more accessible and sometimes it is the only opportunity.

In the past the preference for Russia as a destination for migration was interpreted by the legacies of the past and by the absence of language barrier. Nonetheless, after twenty years of openness to the world these factors are overweighed by the development of migratory ties to other countries, to EU members at the first place. According to Eurostat data, in the EU-28 in 2014 there were 868.7 thousand Ukrainian citizens (permits valid to end of the given year) (figure 2). Despite the fact that Ukrainians constitute only 5% of foreigners residing in the EU and given that Ukrainians were allowed to travel abroad relatively recently, the migratory dynamics of the Ukrainian community is significant. Most of Ukrainians reside in Italy (236.3 thousand), in Poland (210 thousand), in Germany (11.6 thousand), in the Czech Republic (110.7 thousand) and in Spain (82.7 thousand).

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[23] Trud i zaniatostj v Rossii 2013
[24] SMI 2014
[25] Doslidzhennia z pitan migratsii ta torgivli liudmi: Ukraina, 2015 (Research conducted by GfK Ukraine, in March and February 2015, for the IOM Ukraine. 2087 persons interviewed in the territory of Ukraine.

Figure 2.
Number of stay permits valid to end year, and newly obtained permits of Ukrainian citizens in the EU countries



Source: Eurostat: Asylum and Managed Migration, retrieved: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-and-managed-migration/data/database

Only in 2014, 302.7 thousand new permits were issued for Ukrainians for residence in the EU, which is 28% more than in 2013. Most of these permits (83%) were issued in Poland. Basically all of these are short-term permits (3-12 months) and issued for seasonal work. This suggests that the most important objective for Ukrainian migrants to the EU is related to work. 68% of stay permits were issued for employment reasons for Ukrainians, while in total for citizens of third countries only one fourth of stay permits were issued for work.

During the crisis there were some changing components of labor migration. Findings of the analysis of remittances imply that the share of women coming from cities and of Central, Northern and Eastern parts of Ukraine, is growing.[26]

Basically labor migrants have low-skilled profiles and lower educational background than those employed in Ukraine, however the crisis affected not only the well-being of the economically disadvantaged strata, but the middle class as well, that triggers the migration of professionals, especially young professionals. Moreover, a number of target countries introduced policies to attract high-skilled professionals. Gosstat in 2012

[26] Migratsiia yak chynnyk rozytku v Ukrainy 2016

has revealed that compared to a similar poll in 2008, the share of Ukrainian labor migrants employed in high-skill jobs grew from 6% to 10.8%.

The growth of outward movement of qualified migrants is also related to the steep increase in the number of Ukrainians pursuing their studies abroad. UNESCO data suggests that the number of Ukrainian students abroad has doubled and grew up to 39.7 thousands between 2000 and 2012. Another peculiar acceleration of growth of Ukrainian students abroad has been witnessed during the last two years. According to the annual monitoring of CEDOS (covering 34 countries in the world), in 2013/2014 academic year there were 47.7 thousand Ukrainian citizens studying abroad. Just in one year (compared to 2012/2013), the number of Ukrainian students abroad has grown by 22%.[27] The most visible growth in the number of students was in Poland.

Under the conditions of the crisis some changes can be spotted in the legal situation of labor migrants. As said before, during the 1990s employment in the shadow economy was a pattern. Later many illegal employees could legalize their status abroad. Analyzing the data of Gosstat reveals that the share of labor migrants employed without documents has dropped from 25.6% in 2008 to 20.4% in 2012.[28] However, the research of GFK-Ukraine conducted for IOM in 2015 shed light on the growth of illegal labor migration under the economic crisis. This year 41% of respondents[29] worked abroad with no formal arrangement of their status. Growing number of legal violations committed by Ukrainian migrants was registered by the authorities in the target countries. The European border control agency, FRONTEX concludes that the number of Ukrainian citizens detained at the borders of the EU has grown from 12,472 in 2013 to 16,744 in 2014, thus by 34%[30]. The number of Ukrainians expulsed from the territory of EU: with 7,763 in 2013 and 9,582 cases in 2014. Ukrainians represented only 3,8% of foreigners detained at the borders of the EU, and 5,9% of the total number of expulsions, the number is, thus relatively low. However, this suggests the growing risk of illegal migration and the opportunity of violation of human rights and overexploitation of migrants as a consequence.

5. Immigration to Ukraine

While a constant outflow of population from Ukraine was prevailing during the crisis, inward movement has dropped. Before the crisis inward migration gradually grew, despite that Ukraine remained less attractive for migrants. In accordance with the Ukrainian Law "On immigration", 22-23 thousand permits for permanent residence were issued. In 2013, there were 264 thousand foreigners with Ukranian residence

[27] Stadnii 2015
[28] Naselennia Ukrainy 2010
[29] Doslidzhennia z pitan migratsii ta torgivli liudmi: Ukraina 2015
[30] Frontex. Annual risk analysis 2015

permit, i.e. 0.5% of the total population. As result of the political crisis in 2013-2014 the number of immigrants fell to 250 thousand people. Accordingly, the number of permits issued for immigration dropped. According to the statistics of the State Migration Service of Ukraine in 2014, 20 thousand, in 2015 16.6 thousand permits were issued. Most of the immigrants (80%) in Ukraine come from former Soviet countries. More than a half of them obtained their permits on the basis of kinship.

Apart from immigrants residing permanently in the country, there are 75 thousand foreigners obtaining temporary permits. They are foreign students and employees, with steadily growing numbers up to 70 thousand in 2013. Under the crisis, the number of foreign students decreased to 63.6 thousand in 2015 (figure 3). During the 2014/2015 academic year most students came from Turkmenistan (10,265), Azerbaijan (10,085), India (6,167), Niger (3,619), and Morocco (3,457 people). The most popular specializations were medicine and pharmacology.

Figure 3.
Number of foreign students in Ukraine, thousand person



Source: Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine

The drop in labor migration was even more explicit. While in 2010 the Employment Service of Ukraine reported 14 thousand people employed with official permits in Ukraine, in 2015 this number fell to only nine thousand. These are overwhelmingly managers (62.5% in 2015), employed in trade and processing industry (16.7%). Most of them were from Russia (18.8%), Turkey (11.1%), Poland (55%), Belarus (5%) and Germany (4%).

Migration related to asylum seeking in Ukraine, was shaped by the tensions in Afghanistan, where traditionally most refugees came from to Ukraine, the war in Syria, and the institution of subsidiary protection introduced in 2011, which was previously not provided by the legislation. These led to a rise both in the number of applications for refugee status and in the number of refugees as well (thus, persons with subsidiary protection) living in the country. However, the number of refugees still remains relatively

low. In 2015 there were 1.4 thousand claims submitted for asylum mostly from Afghanistan, and also from Syria and Russia. By the end of 2015 there were about more than three thousand foreigners residing in Ukraine with refugee status or subsidiary protection. Due to unfavorable economic conditions and shaky political situation, most of asylum-seekers from the 'zones of conflicts'of the world consider Ukraine rather as a transit corridor than a shelter.

It is also worth spending some words on the illegal transit migration through Ukraine toward the EU. Due to governmental efforts and help of the EU, the risky situation especially in the 1990s was taken under control. Despite the current crisis, it is still under control. The FRONTEX report in 2014 on the borders of Ukraine registered only 0.2% of illegal migrants from the total number heading to the territory of the EU, which is a low number if the unprecedented growth of illegal migration to Europe is taken into account.

The Ukrainian law-enforcement agencies reported a rise in the number of illegal migrants both on the borders and inside the country. On one hand, the growth of these indicators is linked to the efforts of border control and immigration authorities, which is given in the context of the war. On the other hand, due to the heavy migration pressure on the EU and the measures taken by European countries in response, smugglers of illegal migrants are looking for new routes to get into Europe, for e.g. through Ukraine.

In 2015 border guards stopped 1.8 thousand illegal migrants, which almost doubled since 2014 (figure 4.). Most of them came from Afghanistan (36.9%), Syria (10.5%), Moldavia (7%), Georgia (6%), Iraq (5.4%) and Somalia (4.6%).

Figure 4.
Number of foreigners stopped at the borders attempting to enter Ukraine illegally, thousand person



Source: State Border Control Service of Ukraine

The number of migrants without documents certifying their citizenship, stopped by the Migration Service in the territory of Ukraine rose from 3.1 thousand in 2014 to 5.1 thousand in 2015. The majority of undocumented migrants within Ukraine came from former Soviet countries. The largest share of detainees in 2015 were citizens of Russia (29%), Azerbaijan (11.7%), Uzbekistan (9%), Georgia (6%), and Moldova (5%).

6. Migration policy

As a result of independence the previously isolated Ukraine, with its population enclosed within the national borders in Soviet times, after the dissolution of FSU became an arena of migration processes of various directions and character. Outward movement of citizens steeply grew, and the country transformed into one of the most important donors of labor force for Europe. At the same time transit movement of foreigners, including asylum-seekers, has accentuated. These processes has brought about the challenge of regulation of migration, development of relevant legislation frames and establishment of institutions.

In the first years of independence the foundations of migration policy has been laid down by the legislation on migration of Ukraine. However, due to lack of necessary experience, financial and human resources, the establishment of a system efficiently capable to manage migration turned out to be a challenging task overarching the subsequent years. Furthermore, among the complex problems the country faced, migration has never gained priority as it did not prove to be a sharp problem. Thus national migration policy was formed in a reactive manner as response of different challenges of given situations.

In this framework, the government took measures to host and integrate the previously deported Crimean Tatars, who returned to Crimea during the 1990s, setting numerous social challenges. Since 1991 resources for these measures have been allocated in the national budget of Ukraine. The first programme aiming at housing the once deported was introduced in 1996, and the last one was planned up to 2015. Apart from the development of housing and social infrastructure on the spot, the government also provided access to citizenship, employment, culture and education for the repatriated Crimean Tatars.

In the wave of heavy immigration flow of the first half of the 1990s, forced migration has evoked the Law on Refugees (1993), which was the first law developed in the frame of migration policy. The procedure of obtaining refugee status was introduced in 1996. The improved version of the Ukrainian Law on Refugees in 2001 brought the Ukrainian legislation in line with the 1951 Refugee Convention (on the status of refugees by the UN), and enhanced Ukraine to join the Convention in 2002.

The liberalization of the border regime, the undeveloped and often without demarcation line borders between the former Soviet republics, the lack of visa procedures or consulate

services (which were established only later in the 1990s), made Ukraine an attractive region for illegal migration to enter the EU. This process called for an immediate regulation by legislation the status, rights and duties of foreigners. In 1994 the parliament accepted the Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens[31], which defined the rules of residence for foreign citizens, their arrival and departure, and sanctions for violating the norms (overstay, rules ondeportation). In line with the rule of anti-discrimination, foreigners residing in Ukraine permanently got the same rights (except the right to vote and be elected), and bore the same duties (except for military duty) as Ukrainian citizens.

The legislation established and regulated the process of immigration to Ukraine, to receive asylum, refugee status, or citizenship. At the same time, legislation aimed at enforcing control over foreign citizens residing in Ukraine in order to prevent illegal migration. In 1996 the first programme for fighting illegal migration was introduced, which also established special departments within the bodies of interior affairs, mechanisms of coordination of central and local governmental bodies, and a series of prevention measures. The programme-based approach to prevent illegal migration was also applied in the future. Establishment of border, migration and visa control, and the coordination of different bodies and local governmental agencies took control over the unfolding problem of illegal migration.

Above the need to react on complex situations of migration, there were other factors not directly related to migration shaping state policy. The most important political strive was building an open democracy, ensuring human rights and to get rid of Soviet legacies, limiting the freedom of movement. From January1993 the government has removed the regulation of Soviet times, when a citizen had to apply for a 'Permission to Departure' issued by the authorities. In 1994 the Law on Regulation of Departure from and Arrival to Ukraine by Ukrainian Citizens[32] has guaranteed the right to leave the country and return to its territory. Authorities could limit the right to leave the country only temporarily under certain circumstances, which were listed in the law. For a society almost totally closed not so long time ago, this law was somewhat revolutionary.

The right to free movement was spelled out in the Constitution of 1996. Article Nr. 33 guaranteed the right for free movement within the territory of Ukraine, and outside its borders for all, both for home citizens and for foreigners. The Constitution contained other fundamental principles for migration policy. Article Nr. 25 guaranteed the protection of citizens residing outside the country, while article Nr. 26 the equal rights for foreign citizens.[33]

Besides the Constitution, Ukrainian migration policy was shaped by international conventions and documents on human rights, most importantly the European Convent

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[31] Pro pravovii status inozemtsiv 1994
[32] Pro porjadok vjizdu z Ukraini gromajan Ukrainy 1994
[33] Div. Konstytutziia Ukraini 1997

on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which was incorporated in the legislation of the country in 1997.

By the beginning of the new millennium, the foundations of the new migration policy of the country have been worked out. In line with the Decree of the President of Ukraine, which was the first attempt to conceptualize the migration policy[34], the basic principles were: free entrance and departure of Ukrainian citizens, equal rights of foreign and Ukrainian citizens, differentiated approach to different categories of immigrants depending on the national interest of the country. The fundamental approach to migration policy was supposed to be: fostering repatriation, return of the deported, asylum for refugees, legal regulation of immigration of foreign citizens. The Decree has also highlighted that Ukraine was an exporter of labor force, which in fact requires an active policy of the state to ensure social protection of labor migrants and measures to maintain the labor and demographic capacities of the country.

Measures were defined to reach the objectives above, among which, were the development of international cooperation in terms of migration with the UNHCR, and with the International Organization for Migration and the OSCE.

7. External factors and their impact on the development of migration policy of Ukraine

International cooperation has played a major role in the evolution of the migration policy of Ukraine. Integration into the global and European communities was always a priority of the democratic transformation. Active cooperation with international organizations shaped the objectives and content of the Ukrainian migration policy, the legislative process and the establishment of relevant institutions. Its impact is most strikingly visible in the last years, with Ukraine's explicit ambitions for EU- integration.

At the beginning of the 2000s after a period of intense legislative work, evolution of the Ukrainian migration policy has slowed down visibly. Despite the dozens of legislative amendments proposed on the matter, only some of them were considered by the Parliament: those introducing minor adjustments into the existing documents. The reason behind might be, that targets related to overcoming autarky, ensuring human rights, and freedom of movement have been achieved by the beginning of the millennium. At the same time, the country did not come to terms on the strategic goals of its migration policy within the context of openness.

All attempts failed to approve a concept of national migration policy on the legislative level. Priorities and objectives of migration control, as many other issues became a mere

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[34] Pro osnovni napriami sotsialnoi polityky na 1997-2000 roki

battlefield for expressed tensions between the parliament, president and government of those times, which resulted in negative consequences blocking decision-making.

The situation has changed only after Ukraine had been handed an Action Plan for visa regime liberalization in 2010, the substantial part of which was dedicated to migration matters. (Part two included chapters on 'Migration Control', and 'Asylum Policy'. The problem of migration was also addressed in Chapter four dealing with fundamental rights, and partly the right to freedom of movement and fight with discrimination).[35] The plan became an important external trigger for decision-making in problems addressed by migration management.

The Action Plan aimed to push Ukraine toward building efficient institutions in migration management. In December 2010 the establishment of State Migration Service was announced. The necessity of this special executive agency was argued for years. The Migration Service was in charge of implementing governmental migration policy (and preventing illegal migration), naturalization, registration of natural persons and providing asylum for refugees.

The first stage of the implementation of the Action Plan was the 'approval of the national migration strategy'. The decade long debate on the Concept of National Migration Policy has ended in May 2011. This document was approved by the decree of the President of Ukraine[36] and the government approved the action plan for implementation.

The Concept of National Migration Policy of Ukraine was set as strategic priority to improve legislation and migration management based on respect of freedom of movement, protection of refugees, and fight against racism and xenophobia. The Concept set the goal to protect the citizens employed abroad and to provide the necessary conditions for emigrants to return. An important objective was the control of illegal migration and human trafficking.

Unfortunately, the document was developed without the involvement of expert community, and without a wide public debate to contribute to its quality. However, the approval of the Concept of the National Migration Policy of Ukraine was a positive step forward, as it opened the path for further steps for improvement of national migration management and control by invigorating the legislation process.

In 2011, a series of laws entered into force, in line with the Action Plan on the Liberalization of the Visa Regime of the EU. The 'Law on Refugees and Persons in Need of Subsidiary or Temporary Protection[37] was adopted. The title itself suggests that a significantly broader set of applicants was embraced by the new law. Beside those who

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[35] Plan diy z liberalizatsii vizovogo rezhimu 2010
[36] Pro Kontseptsiiu derzhavnoi migratsiinoi polityky 2011
[37] Pro bizhintsiv ta osib, yaki potrebuiut dodatkovogo abo timchasovogo zahistu 2011

were considered as refugees based on the 1951 UN Convention, the law provided protection to those who arrive to or remain in the territory of Ukraine due to being under threat of life, safety, or freedom, under the risk of death sentence, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The procedure for subsidiary protection is the same as for obtaining refugee status. The level of protection is defined by the authorities of the Migration Service after an examination of the application and evaluation of all circumstances. The rights of asylum-seekers and those in need for subsidiary protection are practically identical.

With regards to temporary protection, it is provided for foreigners who seek asylum in Ukraine fleeing from aggression, foreign invasion, civil war, ethnic conflicts, natural and manmade disasters.

In 2011, the parliament approved the improved version of the law on legal status of foreign citizens[38]. The new version contains a series of important definitions, like 'illegal migrant', moreover, the rights of foreigners and stateless are set. It is extremely important that in accordance with the law, those under the jurisdiction of Ukraine, irrespective of their (il)legal status have the right for basic human rights and right to freedom. Humanization of illegal migrants is backed by the provision according to which if an illegal migrant is not removed for reasons he is not responsible for, he gets the opportunity for temporary residence in the country legally. A further novelty introduced was the provision of voluntary return to the home country for the foreign illegal entrants as an alternative to forced removal.

Beside the guarantees of rights for foreigners, the law also enforces measures of enhanced border control upon arrival and stay. Circumstances under which foreigners can be rejected to enter Ukraine, for e.g. if there is suspicion that the real goal of the visit is not in line with the declared purpose, or if he is lacking the sufficient financial resources to cover the stay in the country, etc. are described in detail. The law also defines the rules of arrest and removal of illegal entrants, for e.g. the rules on compensation of expenses of the removal of the foreigner. The document also stipulates that the foreigner cannot be forced to return to his country if under threat of death penalty, inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment.

For implementation of the measures of the Action Plan on liberalization of visa regime, a plan of measures on integration of immigrants to Ukrainian society was approved for 2011-2015[39]. It also included a plan on reintegration of Ukrainian citizens returning back to their homeland. A further governmental decision was taken in 2012 on integration to the Ukrainian society of refugees and persons in need of subsidiary protection.[40]

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[38] Pro vnesennia zmin do deiakyh zakonodavchih aktiv Ukrainy z pytan migratsii 2011
[39] Pro zatverdzhennia planu 2011
[40] Pro zatverdzhennia planu 2012

While the need for changing the legislation on foreigners and refugees had been discussed in governmental circles and in the expert community for long time, issues related to integration of immigrants and reintegration of citizens of Ukraine returning to their homeland were addressed in legislation documentation for the first time. That means, due to the Action Plan not only legislative matters were addressed but issues that were not raised in the context of legislation previously.

In the frame of the second phase of implementation of the Action Plan on Liberalization of Visa Regime approved in 2015, reintegration of those returning in the legislation on 'External Labor Migration'[41] was addressed. Taking into account the volume and the role of labor migration, this legislation was inevitable. Both experts and migrant communities have argued for its necessity. Their suggestions, however, were not supported by the representatives of the legislative force. Only due to the binding force of the requirements of the Action Plan had the Ministry of Social Policy been invited to prepare the legislation. In this process former activists of labor migrants took part as representatives of the civil society.

The bill approved by the parliament, unfortunately, did not fully met the expectations. It was criticized from in- and outside the parliament. It was claimed to be too declarative with no actual prescriptions on action, but stuffed with references to another bill. It lacked the mechanisms of action, putting the implementation under the condition of further legislation yet to be approved.

All in all, the bill on 'External Labor Migration' had also its contributions. It was the first time that the state signaled its readiness to protect their citizens abroad, moreover it proclaimed its willingness to cooperate and to foster their return to the homeland.

The bill incorporated some of the proposals of the migrant associations. It is valid for all Ukrainian citizens working abroad irrespective of their legal status in the country of residence. State policy on labor migration – apart from the usual declarations on protection of rights of citizens abroad, the already accepted relevant international agreements, and combat of illegal migration – now also tackles to 'provide conditions for return to Ukraine and reintegration into society of labor migrants and their family members. Reintegration is addressed by an article, and there is a central body appointed responsible for implementation.

In line with the legislation the state is bind to meet national, cultural, educational and language needs of labor migrants and their families. A whole article is dedicated on the help and support of labor migrants by the diplomatic bodies and consulates of Ukraine abroad. The legislation also covers social organizations established by Ukrainians abroad and guarantees their right to cooperate with central local authorities and non-governmental agencies. By this act the state acknowledges the importance of self-

[41] Pro zovnisniu trudovu migratsiiu 2015

organizing of its citizens abroad, and expresses its readiness for a dialogue with their organizations.

According to the legislation, the state sets the conditions for remittances, partly by opening correspondent bank accounts in Ukrainian banks, and in banks in foreign countries, and by negotiating with international payment systems for regulating the fees of transfers.

Beside the introduced measures a list of important issues concerning labor migrants were scarcely mentioned in the legislation. For example, avoidance of double taxation of income earned abroad is quite vaguely described, and nothing is told about the voting right of migrants. In this respect legislation on 'External Labor Migration' can be valued as an important, but still only a first step taken toward regulation of the legal situation of citizens abroad or those returning home. The declaratory approach of the legislation foresees a further elaboration of series of legislative acts, and enters changes in the current legislation.

Summing up the above mentioned, as a result of social change of the past twenty five years of independence, Ukraine has entered the global and first of all the European migration system and become one of the main sources of labour migrants on the migration map of Europe. Nevertheless, Ukraine is a sending, a target and a transit country at the same time.

Under the conditions of the current economic, military and political crisis, migration has shown an important trend for permanent residence and job-seeking abroad. The country continues to lose its population, and this loss is not counterbalanced by immigration, as Ukraine is not attractive destination for incoming migrants.

In sum, migration is the main reason of population loss in Ukraine. Since 1993 when its population has reached its peak with 52.2 million persons (which happened due to repatriation waves at the beginning of the nineties in spite of the naturally falling birth rates) the population of Ukraine has become less by 10 million. Forecasts say that by 2060 the population will drop by another 10 million and will get substantially older. In 7-8 years the deficit of labor force can hinder economic development.

Taking into account the steady drop of birth rate, migration will remain the only chance to stop depopulation. Shrinking outward movement, return of those who left earlier and attracting immigrants from abroad are issues of national security.

Along with that, the society is not much interested in problems of migration. The state regulation system of migration management is not evolving in the frames of the old paradigm focusing on control and combating illegal migration, while politicians are not ready to understand migration as a source for development.

Due to the pressure of the European Commission in meeting the requirements on improvement of migration management as a condition for visa free regime with the EU, there was a breakthrough in the last years by adopting the legislation on migration and creation of adequate institution for implementation of migration legislation in Ukraine. State migration policy has been defined, and brought in line with the international standards, where protection of human rights, combating illegal migration has been enforced. Still, positive changes in migration management are rather a result of recommendations of the European partners, than due to decision-makers' understanding the role of migration in development, and consolidation of society in solution of migration problems.

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VLADIMIR MUKOMEL

MIGRATION FROM CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES: THE CHALLENGES FOR THE RECEIVING SOCIETIES

1. Introduction

Immigration for Russia is not a choice but a necessity. Labor in Russia becomes a deficit: drastic decrease of employable population creates a completely new situation in the Russian labor markets.

Labor migration soared in early 2000s: in 2000, 213,000 foreign citizens were officially employed, and in 2008, before the crisis, there were 2.4 million foreign employees. (It was only in the 21st century that post-Soviet Russia faced external labor migration.) Migration flows have been transforming very fast. First, at the beginning of the new millennium, about half of labor migrants came from outside the CIS, but in 2013 it was only 11.0%. Changes in the structure of jobs and increasing demand for various qualifications contributed to a different composition of migrants: massive inflows of workers from Central Asia began to enter the Russian labor market. According to the Federal Migration Service (FMS), in 2000-2014 their share increased from 6.3% to 82.5% of all labor migrants from post-Soviet states (Figure 1).

Figure 1.
Share of migrants from Central Asia among official foreign employees in the Russian Federation, %[1]



Source: Romodanovsky and Mukomel 2015, p.10

Migrants are attracted to Russia by higher salaries, living standards,[2] and availability of jobs in the Russian labor market. Even during the current economic crisis, the unemployment rate in Russia is generally quite low and is very low in the regions that host the largest number of migrants.[3]

The latest forecast (medium scenario) by Rosstat expects that in 2016-2030 the population size will grow by 0.9 million, with the number of employable people decreasing by 5 million. Massive migration is built into this forecast – net migration for this period is expected to be 4.9 million people.[4]

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[1] The decline in the share of migrants from Central Asian countries in 2014 is explained by the increased number of Ukrainian and Moldavian citizens who obtained patents during that year. Since 2015 the legislation on legal employment of foreign citizens who come from the countries supporting a visa-free regime with Russia has changed. The assignment of quotas for work permits allowing employment by legal entities was replaced by patents for employment of foreigners by legal entities, in addition to so-called patents that allow official employment by private individuals.

[2] In 2013, Russia was number 57 among all countries in the human development index, whereas most sending countries were in the second hundred: Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan were in the 133th, 125th and 116th places respectively (Human Development Report 2014, 226).

[3] In Moscow in the 1st quarter of 2015 the unemployment rate calculated using an ILO method was 1.6%, in the Moscow region 3.1%, in St Petersburg 1.9% (Employment and unemployment 2015). These regions account for the half of migrants who have work permits.

[4] Demographic forecast 2015

Immigration is becoming one of the most important elements maintaining Russia's economic development potential, preserving stability in certain regions, and ensuring national security.

However, in the process of solving these problems, other serious social and cultural challenges are emerging: the majority of migrants come from patriarchal societies (most of them from Central Asian states) with different cultural traditions and standards of behavior. The host community is irritated; xenophobic sentiments that are widespread in Russian society are mainly focused on migrants belonging to visible ethnic minorities.

The massive inflow of labor migrants of other ethnicities (a lot more than immigration for permanent residence), which come from other societies with different cultural traditions and standards of behavior, will be a real challenge for the country unless they are adapted to the Russian environment and are integrated, if they plan to stay in Russia and enroot a family there. Isolation of migrants from the host society can only lead to an increasingly negative attitude by the host community. In this aspect, the Tajik diaspora which is constantly nurtured by labour migrants, is of interest. Its main problems will be looked upon in what follows. First, it was already in the beginning of the 1990s when Tajiks started coming to Russia in large numbers escaping the civil war. Tajiks were the first from the Central Asian countries who made a path to labour migration and were followed by Kyrgyzs and much later, Uzbeks. Second, for the Tajikistan citizens Russia is almost the only direction for labour migration: more than 90% of Tajiks working abroad go to Russia for work.

2. Challenges posed by migrants' social exclusion and socio-cultural integration barriers of migrant's integration

The consequences of social exclusion are extremely negative. First of all, separation of ethnic migrants supports and perpetuates ethnic identity to the detriment of civil identity and becomes a serious obstacle for the development of civil society.

Secondly, the segmentation of society on the basis of ethnicity and forced labour practices exercised in respect of ethnic migrants undermine the foundation of society and erode public values and norms.

Thirdly, the separation of ethnic migrants and formation of sub-cultural migrant enclaves within host society, including territorial enclaves, becomes a problem that threatens the socio-economic and political stability, especially at the local level. (At present, such processes are underway in the Russian cities mostly in the vicinity of large retail centers and other places of mass employment of ethnic migrants).

Fourthly, ethnic discrimination is gradually expanding onto all representatives of a certain migrant minority, including Russian citizens.

Finally, ethnic discrimination directly jeopardizes the operation of the basic social institutions. Degradation of the public service, army, law-enforcement bodies, judicial system, family, education, etc. is especially dangerous.

The modern Russian society is acquiring a very peculiar form. The contours of a segregated society incompatible with the constitutional foundations of the state organization of the Russian Federation with no historical prospects are emerging in Russia today.

Counteracting the discriminatory practices and social exclusion of migrants is becoming an important social problem that transcends the boundaries of the migration and the integration policies per se.

At present, the integration policy is impeded by certain socio-cultural limitations. In addition to long-term factors that are not susceptible to overnight changes (specific historical experience and traditions of intercultural collaboration of the recipient population, peculiarities and stereotypes of the Russian mentality), the integration potential of the host society, the migrants' adaptability, and the social practices in collaboration between the recipient population and authorities with migrants become especially important for the integration policy.

Xenophobia pervades all layers of Russian society. According to sociological surveys, the slogan "Russia is for Russians!" has been supported by most respondents since the early 2000s.[5]

Representatives of all "visible minorities" encounter xenophobia. But it is representatives of migrant minorities that are not endemic to a certain locale that suffer from xenophobia in the first place.

Immigrants' ethnicity is the key problem. The Russian discourse on migrants substitutes their citizenship with their ethnicity. The mentality of a lay Russian individual is dominated by nationality rather than citizenship. The exaggerated importance of ethnicity that permeates all aspects of social contacts affects migrants in the first place: the phobia of migrants has a clearly ethnic aetiology.

The influx of migrants is perceived by Russians as a violation of the public order, as fragile and unstable as it may be. Counteracting migrants is viewed by the local population as reinstating the status-quo.

Peculiarities of the social organization play a very important role. Russian society does not believe in itself, in other people, and in collaboratively built institutions. People trust only their immediate environment, i.e. families, relatives, and friends. Repelling "aliens" becomes a "natural" reaction to the impotence of individual and social group.

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[5] Public opinion – 2015, p. 198

The confrontation occurs mostly within the socio-cultural sphere: Russians are convinced that migrant cultures dilute the cultural core of local communities. The local population believes that the influx of migrants threatens their social stability and provokes conflicts between migrants and the recipient population, and that migrants do not respect the norms and traditions of their recipient community.

3. Tajik diaspora in the Russian Federation: case study[6]

The Tajik diaspora in the Russian Federation is numerous. In 1992-2013, about 330,000 citizens of Tajikistan received Russian citizenship[7].

The most important characteristics of the Tajik diaspora's transformation in the Russian Federation at the present are the followings: (a) the rapid growth of its population due to labour migrants settling and linking their future and their family's future with the Russian Federation; (b) the qualitative changes in its structure, accompanied by a shift in the social and demographic profiles of the diaspora; (c) transformation of long-term strategies of migratory behaviour that involves the growing number of those who intend to stay in the Russian Federation, and of circular migrants, among whom the number of long-term migrants is increasing; (d) change in the behaviour of Tajiks on the labour market, followed by diversification of employment; (e) accumulation of the initial capital; (f) and increasing social segregation in the Tajik diaspora. (The term diaspora refers to "emigrants and their descendants who live outside the country of their birth or ancestry, either on a temporary or permanent basis, yet still maintain affective and material ties to their countries of origin".[8] For this study, in full accordance with this approach, persons classified as diaspora representatives are those who have ties with Tajikistan either by citizenship, origin (by one's own origin or at least by the origin of one parent) or ethnic identity, those who have stayed in Tajikistan for a long time and those who consider Tajikistan their home country. At the same time, persons under the age of 18 and those who first came to the Russian Federation less than six months prior to this study were not regarded as diaspora representatives[9].

Diaspora representatives differ by their legal status in the Russian Federation. Along with Russian citizenship, they may have a residence permit (permit for permanent residence), a temporary residence permit, or a temporary stay permit (they may have no legal bases for staying or residing on Russian territory).

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[6] The paragraph is based on the author's report (Mukomel 2014).

[7] Data on citizenship are given on Chudinovskyh, O. S., Receiving citizenship in the Russian Federation – trends and policy (manuscript).

[8] Agunias and Newland 2012, p.15

[9] The researches were conducted in three cities of the Russian Federation with the "oldest" and the most numerous Tajik diaspora: in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Yekaterinburg. According to data from the national census of 2010, 25.2 per cent of Tajik nationals in selected regions lived on permanent basis. According to the databank on registration of foreign citizens and stateless persons in these three regions, as of 1 April 2014, there were 30.7 per cent of citizens of Tajikistan. See more (Mukomel 2014).

Holding Russian citizenship does not automatically make its owner as someone who has integrated into the Russian society. In the same vein, having a temporary residence permit (or lack of any legal grounds for staying in the Russian Federation) does not mean that the person intends to stay in the Russian Federation only for a limited period.

Possession of a Russian passport officially allows its owner to enjoy all civil, social and economic rights and significantly reduces the possibility of being discriminated. Practically for all Tajiks, including those who do not mind integrating into the Russian society, the acquisition of Russian citizenship is a desirable goal. Acquisition of a residence permit is almost equally attractive, as it allows its owner to enjoy many economic and social rights. Especially important for a Tajik is that a residence permit, unlike a temporary residence permit and temporary stay permit, gives freedom to choose an employer.

Profiles and Composition of the Diaspora. On one pole, there are formally integrated Russian citizens of Tajik origin who consider themselves as temporary residents. On the other, there are long-term migrants registered in migration bodies as well as illegal immigrants who have been staying in the Russian Federation for years, often with their families. They are actually integrated, albeit only temporary.

> *I know there are Tajiks who have been staying here for decades. Many of them do not register themselves. (Interviewee 12)*[10]

Diaspora representatives who are de jure integrated into the Russian society may not be de facto, and equally, those who are de facto integrated may not be established de jure.

In this survey, 19.3 per cent of the respondents have Russian citizenship, 4.6 per cent have residence permit, 36.4 per cent have temporary residence permit (TRP) and 39.7 per cent have temporary stay permit (The group of those with temporary residence permit is not homogeneous: at the time of the survey, 27.1 per cent have not left Russian territory during the preceding 12 months or more. The latter group of long-term migrants is represented by more mature respondents, most often with families and children).

Long-term migrants,[11] in general, are well integrated into the social environment of Russian regions. They do not have Russian citizenship, a residence permit or a TRP not because of their unwillingness to obtain relevant documents, but as a result of difficulties in obtaining the relevant status.

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[10] Excerpts from the in-depth interviews are put in italics.

[11] A person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least a year, so that the country of destination effectively becomes his or her country of usual residence as defined on R. Perruchoud and J. Redpath-Cross (Perruchoud and Redpath-Cross 2011, p.60)

The legal status and the period during which the Tajiks live/stay in the Russian Federation classify the diaspora representatives by the above-mentioned grounds.

The core of the diaspora includes people with Russian citizenship, as well as citizens of Tajikistan and residing/staying on Russian territory permanently or for a long time. Thus, the core of the diaspora includes all Tajiks who have Russian citizenship, residents (those residing for more than six months) with a residence permit (81.1% of all those who have residence permit), residing with a temporary residence permit and staying in the Russian Federation for at least 10 months in a year (54.4% of those who have TRP), as well as long-term migrants with a temporary residence permit (27.1% of those who have temporary stay permit). Thus, 52.5 per cent of the respondents belong to the core of diaspora.

Those in the semi-peripheral part of diaspora are: (a) individuals with residence permit and living in the Russian Federation from four to six months (16.2% of those who have residence permit); (b) those residing with TRP from seven to nine months (29% of those who have TRP); and (c) circular migrants with temporary stay permits who are staying in the Russian Federation for ten to eleven months during a year (22.5% of this group). Thus, 22 per cent of the respondents can be referred to the semi-peripheral part.

Labour migrants whose work in nature depends on seasonal conditions and is performed only during a part of the year. In this group, migrants were referred to those who have come to the Russian Federation not only once and stayed not less than six months on their last arrival.

The peripheral part of the diaspora – which includes mainly short-term migrants[12] or those with residence permit and who do not stay long in the Russian Federation, and some circular and seasonal migrants, including those who have arrived for the first time – make up a little more than a quarter of the respondents (25.5%).

[12] A person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least three months but less than a year, except in cases where the movement to that country is for purposes of recreation, holiday, visits to friends or relatives, business or medical treatment. For purposes of international migration statistics, the country of usual residence of short-term migrants is considered to be the country of destination during the period they spend in it. (Perruchoud and Redpath-Cross 2011, p. 91). Formally, persons staying in the Russian Federation for a period of less than three months during a year are not migrants. But they are all planning to stay in the Russian Federation for a longer period: only one respondent is planning to return to Tajikistan the next year.

The structure of the diaspora by legal status is given in Figure 2.

Figure 2.
Structure of the Tajik diaspora



[A3]

Source: Mukomel 2014, p.43

Diaspora representatives belonging to its core differ from those belonging to the semi-peripheral and peripheral parts by their social and demographic characteristics. The core of the diaspora includes Tajiks, who are much better educated and who have come to the Russian Federation for the first time earlier (on average, two years earlier – the average year of arrival of the diaspora core representatives is 2004, while 2006 is the average year for the diaspora representatives of the semi-peripheral and peripheral parts). They differ also by their marital status: the number of those married among them is less, as there are more widows and divorcees.

The differences between these groups are not only limited to the social and demographic parameters: representatives of the core, semi-peripheral and peripheral parts differ in their economic status (including employment, wages and income), life plans for the future, composition of families and households economies, communications with other Tajiks and the like. Basically, these are differences in the level and style of life, and in organizing relations with the social environment both in the Russian Federation and Tajikistan.

The educational attainment of the Tajik diaspora representatives is quite high: the majority (3/4) are people with secondary general and secondary special/vocational education. Diaspora representatives with higher education and academic degrees make up 16.6 per cent, and those with incomplete higher education make up 3.9 per cent of

the respondents. Only 6 per cent of Tajiks have no general secondary education (though among the women, the share of such respondents is high and makes up 10.4%).

The social and demographic characteristics of the respondents (representatives of the Tajik diaspora) significantly differ both from the similar parameters of labour migrants as well as characteristics of the resident population of Russian cities.

The social and demographic profiles of the Tajik diaspora are transitional between the profiles of Tajik labour migrants and the host population.

The main part of diaspora representatives have been living in the Russian Federation since 2000; of these, more than half of the respondents arrived during the first decade of the 2000s (54.4%). The majority of diaspora representatives (62.8%) at the time of the survey have been staying in the Russian Federation for 10 months or more, and 42.4 per cent have not left for a year or more.

Diaspora Representatives on the Labour Market. The main motives for coming to the Russian Federation in the 2000s are connected with work opportunities and earnings. The rate of the labour remuneration is significantly lower than in the Russian Federation and the unemployment rate is high. Thus, coming from Tajikistan, they can use more of their labour skills in the Russian Federation (39.6% of respondents did not have any work at home before coming to the Russian Federation). The overwhelming majority of the interviewed representatives of the diaspora are working in the Russian Federation or looking for work.

The main types of employment of the diaspora representatives are as follows: wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and of household goods (33.0%); construction sector (26.2%); and communal, social and personal services (15.6%). Those in the fourth category of working migrants are engaged in other economic activities.

Of the respondents, 80.9 per cent of those who work or are looking for jobs are men. Their jobs are more diversified than those of women. Along with the main areas of employment that include construction (32.3%) and trade (29.6%), men are also widely represented in municipal services (14.4%) and in transport and communication (8.5%).

The main portion of women among our respondents are concentrated in trade (47%). Another 20.9 per cent of women work in communal, social and personal services and 9.0 per cent in hotels and restaurants. Women, as a rule, are less pretentious when choosing their place of work, especially in the older age groups, and the industries of their possible employment provide very few opportunities for professional growth.

The bulk of the diaspora representatives (59.3%), who had work experience before coming to the Russian Federation and are working now in the country, worked in the following industries in their homeland: agriculture (18.6%), construction (15.6%), wholesale and retail trade (15.3%) and transport and communications (10.7%).

More than a third of those who had work experience before coming to the Russian Federation are engaged in general works where there are no necessary requirements in terms of education and qualifications. On such workplaces, 18.5 per cent of representatives from occupational groups have specific special requirements for education (availability of higher or secondary special education); these are heads of organizations and their structural units and highly skilled and semi-skilled specialists.

Migrants' education, skills and professional knowledge are not in demand in the Russian labour market; migrants in a mass scale replenish the lower occupational groups. The 71.4 per cent of Tajiks who were employed before coming to the Russian Federation have to change their economic activities; 65.6 per cent changed the occupational group to which they belonged at home.

Only 7.7 per cent of those who were previously employed in the field of education are now working in the same industry in the Russian Federation. A similar proportion is among those working in the health-care system (9.1%). More than half of these workers are now employed in construction and trade, and every sixth are in the communal and social services.

A significant part of the diaspora representatives are working on workplaces that do not require special skills; 39.8 per cent of Tajiks work as general labourers. (According to the survey conducted among labour migrants, 46.7% of migrants from Tajikistan work as general[13]). Based on the Russian Federation's national economy, only 10.8% of employees are general labourers[14)].

Migrants' typical pathway (trajectory) is finding employment at the worse workplaces, compared with where they worked at home. For example, 39.7 per cent of highly qualified specialists who had an appropriate workplace at home are working in the Russian Federation as common labourers. (27.9% of those with higher education work as common labourers.)

The demand for unskilled labour is supplied mostly by skilled workers. "The status in exchange for wages" is a conscious choice of migrants, but this does not eliminate problems of inefficient investments into the human capital by the sending states and inefficient use of this capital from the side of the Russian Federation.

An Outward Glance: Identity. The general understanding of diaspora was formulated by one of the informants:

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[13] Analysis of the migration profile, of problems of adaptation and integration of migrants for the National Research University “Higher School of Economics” (HSE CEPRS/Center for Ethnopolitical and Regional Studies, Russian Federation 2011) was performed by the CERSR. At the end of 2011, there were 8,499 migrants in 8 regions of the Russian Federation who were interviewed, including 1,691 immigrants from Tajikistan.

[14] Labour and employment 2011, pp.81–82.

Diaspora – it is a nation, language, culture and religion. (Interviewee 6)

There is also such a point of view that it is too early to speak of the Tajik diaspora, that it is not yet formed, as there is no specific diasporic identity yet.

I am against the word "diaspora" ... Until the diaspora is not united under the common spiritual field, it is a community. We have not self-defined yet. (Interviewee 18).

I do not see any idea that could unite Tajiks in Russia. (Interview 10)

Another expressed position is that there is no solidarity among Tajiks, and hence there is no diaspora itself.

Diaspora – it's just a concept. Actually, there is no diaspora. Everybody exists on his own account. There are communities, acquaintanceships. (Interviewee 13)

One informant expressed an important idea: the barrier between the diaspora and labour migrants is caused by the distrust that is probably mutual, based on social inequality and cultural differences.

Most respondents mentioned the following, rarely ranging, hierarchy of identities: Tajik, Muslim, Tajik language and citizenship. More rarely, regional affiliation was mentioned.

The blurring of identities takes place in the diaspora, especially in the second generation who are partly losing Tajik language skills, ties with the particular location and with the country of origin. Even religious affiliation, seemingly resistant to external effects, sometimes becomes eroded, particularly in mixed families.

Representatives of the older generation mention that the next generation, though still preserving their national and religious identity, is already different.

They also are Muslims and they are Tajiks, but with different ideas and principles, approaches. They usually know several languages, have studied various disciplines...

... Muslims, who today receive education in schools and universities in Russia, think differently. They have grown up in Russia, not in Tajikistan. They have different visions of life, different interests and values. Even if you are to look in terms of understanding of Islam, they understand it based on the life in Russia. (Interviewee 24)

The vast majority of Tajiks in the Russian Federation, being patriotic and nostalgic about their homeland, identifies themselves with Tajikistan. From the question: "What country is your home?" 72.8 per cent of the respondents answered Tajikistan, 19.2 per cent named the Russian Federation, 2.6 per cent answered other countries and 5.4 per cent were at a loss for words.

Physically, with our body, we are in Russia, but our heart is in Tajikistan (Interviewee 2).

It is good to be a Tajik. (Interviewee 7)

There are some nuances: respondents belonging to the core of the diaspora significantly more often identify themselves with the Russian Federation (Table 3.3). In contrast, diaspora members belonging to the peripheral and semi-peripheral parts of the diaspora, despite often expressing their intention to stay for good, very rarely associate themselves with the Russian Federation.

Among the old-timers of the diaspora, there are those who completely deny their relationship to Tajikistan (and basically should not be associated with the diaspora).

I have nothing to do with Tajikistan to [sic]. I don't communicate neither with any organizations associated with Tajikistan nor with diasporas ... with nobody from Tajikistan. I consider myself a "like Russian" [Russianized]. (Interviewee 9)

We are Russians at hearts. (Interviewee 4)

For diaspora members, Tajikistan is associated with a social setup of the country that is different from the Russian Federation with habitual lifestyle.

We were brought up in the spirit of collectivism. We cannot stay without neighbors, without different arrangements, without chaikhana (tea house). (Interviewee 2)

However, the second generation of the diaspora, whose socialization took place in the Russian Federation and familiar with the Tajik society either by hearsay or through rare trips to Tajikistan, often do not share such nostalgia. Representatives of the second generation have fully integrated into the Russian society, and their parents more often tend to believe that they are rather assimilating than integrating.

Children – they are absolutely assimilated (Interviewee 16)

Here are my children – they have the Russian mentality. If they feel themselves as representatives of Russian people, what's wrong with that? (Interviewee 18)

Children will not return to the place where they had never lived. For them, Moscow is their own home. (Interviewee 3)

Even if representatives of the second generation experience problems with self-identification, it is mostly because of their belonging to the "visible" minority.

Greater problems are faced by representatives of the so-called one-and-a half generation – these are children who were brought to the Russian Federation in a relatively conscious age of 6 to 15 years and who have undergone primary socialization in Tajikistan. They perfectly speak Russian, as a rule, have a Russian citizenship, and by all formal features have been integrated into the Russian society. However, many of them (especially the teenagers), have problems in communication with the local population (but not with their coevals) and are in search of their own identity.

In contrast to the second generation of migrants whose socialization takes place in the Russian Federation, representatives of the "one-and-a half generation" preserve memories of their country of origin, social setup, as well as codes of conduct and traditions of the sending society. For them, dual (multiple) identity is typical. They perceive themselves as a group of culturally adapted individuals speaking the language of the country of residence, but to whom the society has erected barriers as to "aliens." The communication practices of representatives of the "one-and-a half generation" with their coevals demonstrate their certain aloofness from the ethnic majority; they communicate with natives of the country from where their family has come as often as they do with local Russians. More than half of the respondents retain relations and contacts with friends left in the country where they were born. Their life plans are often not associated with the Russian Federation.[15]

Diaspora members try to arrange marriages for their children with families from Tajikistan in order to support hierarchical relationships of subordination and adhere to traditional age and gender roles for the Tajik family. However, for the "one-and-a half generation" habitual questioning of obedience is rarely seen.

These are just informal associations (networks, communities, teams, etc.) that provide assistance to migrants' needs in conducting religious and ritual arrangements. Within the framework of informal associations, there are organized ceremonies, such as funeral, commemoration and carrying out religious rituals, such *as mavlud, tarobeh* and others.[16] In construction work, the role of the imam (the head of the Muslim community) is often performed by a foreman.[17] This highlights the role of informal migrant communities in the organization of the religious life of migrants.

The most important problem of organizing the diaspora is the lack of harmonized interests of its different communities. The first major reason is disagreements within the diaspora.

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[15] For more details, see (Mukomel 2013b)

[16] Mavlud is a holiday on the occasion of the prophet Muhammad's birthday. Tarobeh is a special prayer that is read on fasting days (Ramadan).

[17] Migration and Development 2010, p.41

The second reason that was already discussed above is localism. It is often caused not only by regional belonging, but also by civil, ethnic or linguistic identity. Natives of Pamirs, Samarkand and Khujand are particularly mentioned.

Communities of origin are often competing or openly conflicted with each other. Thereby, conflicts between communities of origin arise because of competition on the labour market, in business and in the redistribution of influence zones. Respondents also mention relationship problems between communities of origin.

The intensive process of social stratification takes place in the diaspora.

> *In Tajikistan, the migration has divided into three layers: poor, average and rich migrant.*
>
> *-Hurshed, 43 years old, with higher education, works in a service centre in Moscow*

However, currently, social stratification is relatively small. The existing inequality in income is disproportionately lower than it is in the Russian society. The decile coefficients that express the ratio between the average income of 10 per cent of the highest-income migrants and the average income of 10 per cent of the lowest-income migrants, according to the survey, make up 4.5. For comparison, in the Russian Federation, it was 16.4[18] and 7.8 in Tajikistan[19].

Language Practices. An overwhelming majority of the diaspora representatives are fluent in Russian, and 40.3 per cent are fluent in Uzbek. Russian language is dominant in the workplace and in public. In private conversations, representatives are usually bilingual: at home, they speak Tajik a bit more often and speak Russian with friends. In Uzbek families and in private conversations, they speak Uzbek.

Fluency in Russian facilitates integration into the Russian society and gradually expands the Russian language, but it also narrows the use of the mother tongue.

In upbringing the succeeding generations, the diaspora members face specific problems. Nowadays, the second generation very often either does not know the Tajik language or prefer to communicate in Russian in private conversations too.

> *Children speak Russian, although we try to speak Tajik at home. But they no longer talk with us. They spend all their time in the Internet. (Interviewee 14)*

In mixed families, communication is not always in Tajik. Children who grew up in the Russian Federation often prefer to speak Russian, even if they understand Tajik because

[18] Rosstat 2012
[19] UNDP 2009

of their socialization in the Russian environment: "They are already Russians," as most would claim. Informants often complain that the next generation's knowledge of Tajik language is getting worse, and they no longer strive to preserve the language.

Table 1.
Preferences for providing post-secondary education based on speaking Tajik language at work (%)

Preferred country for providing children's education	Speaking Tajik at work	
	No	Yes
Russian Federation	63.4	45.1
Tajikistan	36.6	54.9

Source: Mukomel 2014, p.80

Among those who communicate with friends in Tajik (at least sometimes), about half (53%) assume that their children will continue education in Tajikistan; 23 per cent of the respondents who do not communicate with friends in Tajik prefer the same choice.

Table 2.
Preferences for providing post-secondary education based on speaking Tajik language with friends (%)

Preferred country for providing children's education	Communicating with friends in Tajik	
	No	Yes
Russian Federation	77.2	47.5
Tajikistan	22.8	52.5

Source: Mukomel 2014, p.80

Long-term strategies. Long-term strategies and plans of Tajiks are formed under the influence of a wide range of factors. First is the "success" in the home country and in the Russian Federation. If the person's stay in the Russian Federation promotes the real implementation of one's life plans, then it is more probable that one will stay here for a long time or for good.

The second important factor is the ratio of social ties of diaspora representatives in the host country and country of origin. If a foreigner has considerable social capital in the Russian Federation but has weak social ties in his/her homeland, the chances of staying are increased.

In contrast, the small volume of social capital in the host environment, while maintaining social ties at home, stimulates returning to the country of origin.

The age and gender roles that people play in the traditional Tajik family are of great importance. Thus, men have to take care of their parents and arrange marriages for their children, so regardless of their desire, they return to Tajikistan to carry out their duties.

If a migrant is over 45, he has to return home in order to bring up his children and take care for his parents, who are already old and definitely need care. (Interviewee 7)

More than half of the diaspora representatives associate their future with the Russian Federation: 37.8 per cent of the respondents are planning to stay for good and 27.9 per cent are going to travel constantly between Tajikistan and the Russian Federation. Some respondents are currently planning to return home: 6.4 per cent intend to do so in a few months after having earned money, and 16.2 per cent after having worked for another year or two. (Another 1.8% of the respondents intend to stay for some more time in and then migrate to other countries).

Tajiks belonging to the core of the diaspora, who have taken root in the Russian Federation and are integrated into the Russian society, are much more inclined to stay for good.

The important factors at making decisions in favour of a particular migration strategy are the following: (1) the degree of success in realizing the plans that originally existed in relation to migration; (2) the ratio of social capital in the Russian Federation and at home; (3) evaluation of the host and sending environment for the favourable conditions of staying; and (4) factors of the institutional character in both countries. Those belonging to the core of the diaspora, who were more successful in realizing their plans and have a great social capital in the Russian Federation, understand "the good and the bad" of living in the Russian Federation and make a sober estimate of the institutional environment of the sending and receiving societies. They have undeniable advantages over the peripheral part, the backbone of which consists of temporary labour migrants.

4. Conclusion

Nevertheless, there is no alternative to the integration policy. The most sensitive problems for labor migrants-tough access to labor markets, discriminating pay practices, poor working conditions-should be addressed in a more appropriate and responsible way.

Studies define several layers of problems that require different approaches and changes in both legislation and law enforcement. First, the transformation of migration flows accompanied by large-scale movements of permanent and circular migrants needs to be acknowledged, which, in turn, implies changes in adaptation and integration policies and labor market regulation. Second, "feminization" of migrant flows and growth of the number of children require special attention to these socially vulnerable groups of migrants. Migration policy is getting closer to social policy-which means the appearance of its new functions and goals as well as new challenges.

According to the results of surveys by leading Russian sociological centers, xenophobic sentiments in Russian society have decreased in 2014. With the introduction of patents

for employment by individual persons in 2015, there appeared a new, quite pragmatic and transparent procedure for granting migrants access to local Russian labor markets, and the conditions are becoming more favorable for adaptation of labor migrants and integration of those who plan to stay in Russia. These problems have to be solved; otherwise the inflow of labor migrants coming from societies with different cultural traditions and norms of interethnic communication would become a global challenge for the country's future.

However, the processes of adaptation and integration of foreigners are highly influenced by institutional and non-institutional actors of the host society. Different stakeholders of migration policy can both help and hinder successful adaptation and integration of migrants: governmental and local authorities, business (including shady entrepreneurs), receiving society, diaspora and migrant networks. Efficient migration policy implies taking into account the interests and distribution of powers of the actors, considering the realities of migration processes, and the readjustment of regulation instruments depending on the transformation of migration flows.

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JULIANNA FALUDI

MIGRATION AND DEPENDENCY STRUCTURES IN THE POST SOVIET REGION

1. Introduction

The post-Soviet area is clearly nested into the world economy, and is participating in people's move on a global scale. Russian Federation produces 2.4% of the world GDP ranking it among the top 10 of the world, while the post-Soviet countries (Baltic states included) contribute to the world's GDP with 3.3%. Russia is the fourth top destination country in the world (it has dropped from the third place in 2013 with 10.9 millions) after the US, Saudi Arabia and Germany. Ukraine (5.6) follows at the fifth place shared with Afghanistan, and then comes Kazakhstan (3.8). 2014 has changed the figures especially for Ukraine. Russia-Ukraine is the second largest migration corridor (after Mexico-US), and Ukraine-Russia is the forth in the world.[1]

Zooming into the post-Soviet area reveals a particular structure. On one hand there is a tendency of diverging and loosening ties between the countries, on the other hand dense interrelatedness is still present on many levels. First, I give an overview of the Soviet legacies, then I look at the data in search for patterns of exchange or rivalry defining relationships and the possible vulnerability of given states within the area. In search of the structures behind the flow of people I am interested in how dependency structures shape the interrelation of the countries of the post-Soviet area. This study relies on the descriptive and dynamic statistical account rather than historical as explanatory, based on country-level data. Overarching the past 25 years, my focus falls on current trends relying on data of the past 5-10 years.

2. Soviet Legacies and the World Economy

Despite the strict boundaries within the bipolar world order (1948-1990) the Soviet Union and its zone of influence have been part of the global economic circuit. Socialist countries when emerged and were later extended toward Asia and Africa, flied in the face of global capitalism as an economic challenge, blocking the way for capital flows. Rivalry in the cold war divided the globe into interest areas. However, the two blocs did not exist as entirely closed systems, as socialist states contributed with goods to the world trade circuit and to global growth.[2]

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[1] WB Migration Factbook 2016
[2] Böröcz 2009, Dén-Nagy-Faludi-Ihász-Tóth 2013

The switch to state socialism in Europe in the twenties and thirties of the past century evoked migration toward the West and North.[3] Overarching the iron curtain waves of immigration overwhelmingly from East to the West were induced by political events (e.g. 1956 in Hungary). Meanwhile, global movements from the former colonies took a North-West direction in the late decades of the twentieth century. Restricted movement between the countries of the Socialist bloc and the Soviet Union featured migration for military or education purposes, or movement of highly qualified experts employed in the Soviet Union.

3. From the SU toward the CIS

Russia's central role in the Soviet Union rooted in the expansion policy of the tzar era in the nineteenth century. In the name of internationalism and sliyanije (merger) policy the Soviet state first proclaimed the establishment of the socialist nation, designed to tone down the contrasts and inequalities. During Stalinism several waves of forced ethnic displacements took place[4], as well as centrally coordinated movement of labor force within the planned economy (see later).

Due to the industrialization and then the reconstruction of the country after WW II demand for labor has grown in the Western Russian cities that was met by supply from the (Central) Asian regions. The allocation of labor force was centrally designed and controlled in the frame of the planning economy. Large investments, especially in Central- and Eastern-Russia were supplied with construction workers from Central-Asia with short term, three-year contracts at maximum (limitchiki).[5] It is also important to note that industrialization and urbanization also affected the periphery, where large Soviet cities were developed and engineers, architects, scientists etc. have moved from the center. Russification and the establishment of the Soviet education, welfare and health system all over the country has also brought about West-East and North-South movement. By 1989 the most important migratory trends of West to East, and North to South have changed direction, as Russian-speakers and ethnic Russians moved from the South toward the North (from Central-Asian republics), Tatars of Crimea, or German minorities moved from Kazakhstan toward the West and North etc. The pace of urban migration has slowed down, and there was an intensive move from the European part of the Soviet Union toward Israel, Germany and Greece.[6]

We know that in an interstate system the borders of the countries become more or less permeable and on occasion are redrawn altogether.[7] Before the interstates system of the CIS has formed, Republics of the Soviet Union have proclaimed their independence

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[3] Portes-Böröcz 1989
[4] Sahadeo 2012a
[5] Sahadeo 2012b
[6] Roland 1993
[7] Wallerstein 1974, p.25

and established their borders as a result of a process (many of them before the official termination of the SU). These new borders were shaped by the construction of the identity of the new states, and reflected their relation to the legacies of the past empire. Internal migration within the Soviet Union became international, where states had to develop their own policies and institutions in tracing the movement of people. States were also challenged by handling forced migration (e.g. flood of refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan, Armenia, the separation of Trans-Dnistria from Moldova, South-Osetia and Abkhazia from Georgia, and later the Chechen war) due to war, armed conflict and natural disease, ethnic movements for obtaining citizenship within the competition of repatriation policies between Russia and other states. The newly independent states wearing national identity on their sleeve reflected in their country names, however ethnic diversity was prevalent to the extent where majority was actually a minority: with 44% of Kazakhs in Kazakhstan or 33% in the Kyrgyz Republic.[8] Movement of ethnic minorities was driven by the risk of losing the possibility of obtaining citizenship in the newly established (national) states. For example citizenship was granted for ethnic Kazakhs across the states, while dual nationality was not allowed for in the home country. (This policy was driven for getting more votes from ethnic Kazakhs at the elections.) Russia's repatriation policy has attracted ethnic Russians overwhelmingly from Central Asia and the Caucasus, after the stabilization of the political situation in 1996 migration has decreased.[9]

The plan economy that coordinated resources collapsed along with the Soviet Union. New states faced recession, social and economic tension. Despite the disintegration process, economic and trade relations remained however on a lower scale arranged and enforced within the interstate system of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS: established in 1991) area. The alliance claimed to respect independence of the member states, and Russia to be the legal successor of the Soviet Union and was organized along preexistent paths.

Within the former Soviet space Russian was used as lingua franca, economic and transportation networks, and communication systems were shared. Moreover, within the CIS the education system and visa-free regime[10] allowed for easy internal labor migration. Thus borders in the interstate system of the CIS were permeable both in terms of exchange of goods and labor force. The Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), Georgia (left the CIS after the war, in 2009), and Turkmenistan opted out. Despite the fact that Ukraine along with Russia and Belarus was the founder of the CIS, it did not ratify the charter, thus formally is not a full member, however, participates in the activities.

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[8] Korobkov 2007, p.: 176
[9] Korobkov, Zaiachkovskaya 2004, Molodikova 2007
[10] Molodikova 2008

The fall of the Soviet Union at the same time brought about a growing competition of the states to house production-accumulation networks, and a fierce competition in the global arena: as borders became more permeable for the flow of capital, labor and goods with the EU and overseas as well. After the large waves of migration toward the West from the former Soviet countries in the late eighties and early nineties Central and Eastern-European countries were also on the map of migrants as destination. Visa regimes became loose, and work permits were easy to obtain. However, the EU enlargement in 2004 has brought about mutual restrictions with many former socialist Central and Eastern-European countries that shifted the focus toward further destinations for migrants coming from the CIS with their higher living standards, wider opportunities for work and entrepreneurship with the same cost of complying the regulation. Among the new member states countries with similar language and culture are still attractive for migrants of the former Soviet countries (e.g. Poland, Czech Republic for migrants from Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, etc.). During the years China has also become an important partner in the flow of migration to and from Russia: 6404 people arrived to Russia and 7633 left in 2015. Germany (a negative balance of 305 people). As for Georgia (net migration was 2433 in 2015, where all in all more than 5000 people arrived to Russia from Georgia) it is still a very important migration corridor.[11]

But now let's switch our focus to the former Soviet countries. Russia's policy of openness (that granted citizenship for any ex-Soviet citizen until 2000, and after some years of rigor, from 2005-10) has also served to pull in labor force and to improve demographics. The above processes have resulted in a peculiar pattern of stock migrants in the former Soviet countries. (Data shall be treated with caution, as due to the different waves of repatriation and ethnic policy in different states, ethnic minorities might hold citizenship of a different state). Overwhelming majority, over 80 and 90% of the stock migrants of these states come from countries of the former Soviet Union. Most of the post-Soviet migrants are from Russia (not Armenia, see in Figure 1), and majority of Russian stock migrants can be found in Kazakhstan, Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine, and Belarus. However, ethnic Russians were present in many cases long before the Soviet Union emerged, as a result of the expansion of the Russian Empire. In the case of Kazakhstan for example, from the 17th century when first Russians soldiers arrived, then after the abolition of serfdom along with the rural-urban migration flow related to industrialization in the European part of the Empire, Russian peasants were designated parcels in the Asian territories Empire. By 1916, this resulted in 60% of the population in Kazakhstan made up by ethnic Russians. As nomadic lifestyle requires larger territories than agriculture, this was a serious economic and social shock for the Kazakh population.[12] Furthermore, the data suggest that the largest recipient countries in the post-Soviet region are Russia, followed by Kazakhstan and Belarus.

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[11] Source: Russian Federal Statistics
[12] Aldashev, Guirkinger 2012

Figure 1.
Stock of migrants in the post-Soviet countries

Destination Country	World	- From post Soviet Area	Post-Soviet % of stock migrants	Russian % of stock migrants (world)	Russian% of post-Soviet stock migrants
Armenia	658 789	528 263	80	9	11
Azerbaijan	360 600	326 531	91	55	61
Belarus	1 248 977	1 244 671	99.7	65	65
Estonia	381 997	380 193	99.5	74	75
Georgia	338 300	313 710	93	56	61
Kazakhstan	3 619 200	3 111 023	86	68	80
Kyrgyz Republic	623 083	578 079	93	56	60
Latvia	646 007	580 275	90	70	78
Lithuania	349 258	324 434	93	45	49
Moldova	578 500	549 247	95	58	61
Russian Federation	11 524 948	11 039 013	96	–	–
Tajikistan	425 900	391 330	92	55	60
Turkmenistan	306 500	283 125	92	55	60
Ukraine	6 892 920	6 417 172	93	73	78
Uzbekistan	1 653 000	1 457 164	88	48	54
Total	***29 607 979***	***27 524 230***	***93***		

Source: Calculated based on WB data (2009-2012)

Figure 2.
Russian as Ethnicity and Language



Source: World Bank data

4. Core and Periphery in the post-Soviet Area

Movement of people is a great indicator for understanding the hegemonic relations within the body of one expanding economy.[13] From the broader perspective of labor-capital I look at the country level data, encompassing all states of the post-Soviet area (in some cases not all data is available for each country, or each given year).

Looking at the patterns of movement of people, I sketch attractiveness by dynamics of net migration, productivity, and look at the patterns of investment in the area. For vulnerability I look at the dynamics of share of agriculture in the economy, where a significant drop in the past decades might be underlying social change resulting in outward movement. Then assuming that scarcity in energy makes an economy dependent, I draw on the role of energy-import along with trade. Remittances and FDI highlight dependency structures of capital flow.

The dynamics of net migration in the area has seen a slight shift since the beginning of the nineties. Looking through the time span, countries that faced significant change in economic transformation proved to be the senders over the years. This looks even more dramatic in population share in the case of Moldova, Tajikistan, Armenia, Georgia, and Uzbekistan. Russia has kept its central role, Belarus as well, after facing a wave of outward migration (emigration) in times of transition. Kazakhstan after the waves of above discussed ethnic movements related to repatriation policies, caught up by 2007-2012. These latter three countries show a positive net migration.

Figure 3.
Net Migration



Source: Calculated based on World Bank data

[13] Wallerstein 1974

Geography and geopolitics suggest a breakdown of the region into the Baltic States, The European Border, Central Asia, Caucasus and Russia. Countries can be grouped based on their economic performance where similar patterns suggest their dense interrelatedness. The Baltics, thus Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, were leading in 2014 in the per capita value, mostly due to smaller share of inhabitants and the benefits of the European cohesion policy. Before, Russia took the second place (and first), but data from 2014 reflects the political and economic difficulties related to war and lowering energy prices. However both in value of GDP (GDP at market price), and in FDI Russia clearly takes far the lead. A further breakdown suggests pairing of countries: Russian Federation and Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan followed by Belarus and Azerbaijan, then Georgia and Armenia, and the pair of Moldova and Ukraine. The three low-productivity countries of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan have witnessed severe economic and social changes over the past decades that affected both the rural county and employment structure of these countries. But let us see how interdependence of these zones has evolved.

Unequal relations based on significant economic and social disparity in the area root back in times before the Soviet Union emerged. Abolition of serfdom, industrialization, and the urbanization processes of the European territory channeled Russian traders, statesmen, soldiers and settlers toward the newly acquired territories of the expanding Russian Empire. Later, the Soviet planning economy has designated territories for agricultural production, industry, and mining of raw materials. As a result, Russia became the core of industrial production, where resources were pulled from the periphery of Central-Asia and Eastern-Russia. From the perspective of migration, economic and political relations the core of the post-Soviet area is Russia strongly interrelated with Kazakhstan and Belarus, moreover this is expressed in a custom union among the three countries.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan has lost 13% of its population mainly due to ethnic migration of Ukrainian, German, Belorussian, Russian and Tatar minorities.[14] It is a sending country toward Russia, however the push factor nowadays can be attributed more to the lack of economic perspectives than to ethnic migration. Outward migration fell from 2003, and Kazakhstan has become an important destination country for its Southern neighbors: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Republic, and China.[15]

Belarus is also a country with a positive net migration balance. Due to its official bilingual status it attracts and sends Russian speakers from and to Ukraine and Russia. The largest ethnic minorities are Russians and Polish. There were no extensive market reforms after the transition, however, the country faced an economic downturn as well. Within the framework of the planning economy heavy industry was designated to Belarus that proved to be too large to handle after gaining independence in 1991. By

[14] Aldashev, Dietz 2014
[15] An, Becker 2013

today most important market for industrial goods produced in Belarus is Russia, which is the energy-supplier at the same time.[16] Belarus is one of the most energy-dependent economies in the area with its 85.4% of its consumption imported (see Figure 8).

The Baltic States being part of the EU take on a special role. During the Soviet times, and after the transition these countries were leading in terms of living conditions (partly reflected in the GDP per capita). Despite slow growth, their economies are stable. The Baltic States focus on their economic, political ties outside the CIS, however still nested in the post-Soviet area at least in terms of migration, flow of people and resources.

Growth rates of the regions of the post-Soviet area have shown a more or less similar pattern. After the collapse of the nineties (along with the financial crisis in 1997), the second millennium saw growth related to energy prices. Since the latest economic crisis growth slowly catches up, while. The Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine are on the path of downturn.

Figure 4.
GDP per Capita in 2014



Source: World Bank data

[16] Bobrova, Shakhotska, Shymanovich 2012

Figure 5.
GDP Growth Dynamics



Source: World Bank data

The hurdle of transition from a planned toward a market economy affected all the states, with lost markets, collapse of payments system, poor governance, geopolitical instability and political unrest.[17] The vulnerable ones faced a more fierce competition where both previous trade opportunities and exported goods have shrunk. As an example, in the frame of the Soviet planning economy the South took its share in agricultural production. Economies where agriculture played an important role have faced a severe economic downturn. Year 1992 shows the state of the economy after the collapse of the Soviet Union (for 1991 not all data were available), year 2004 represent the times of picking up after the first collapse in 1998, and 2014 shows how the 2008-2009 second financial crisis that swept across the area in 2008-2009. No significant transformation in the volume of agriculture took place in Russia, or Latvia and Lithuania where data is available from 1997, which is in general the same as in 2004. We can see from the data that the most dramatic fall took place from 1992 to 2004.

Dramatic transformation took place in Georgia and Moldova where the agricultural production represented half of the GDP, while in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan the focus from

[17] Kireyev 2006

agriculture shifted towards the energy and services sector. Kyrgyz Republic shows a less dynamic change, agriculture is still an important sector, just like in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The biggest share of agriculture in the economy is in Tajikistan (27% of GDP), the country most dependent on remittances in the region at the same time.

Figure 6.
The Role of Agriculture



Source: World Bank data

When looking at the same dynamics related to manufacturing we can see that Armenia, Kyrgyz Republic, Ukraine, Tajikistan saw a dramatic drop. Manufacturing today plays an important role in Belarus (33%), Tajikistan (24%), in Ukraine (23%), and Turkmenistan (22%). The Baltic States did not face a dramatic change here.

5. Dependency Structures within the post-Soviet Region

To see energy-dependency dynamics in the table below countries above the horizontal axis are dependent on energy import, and at the same time tend to have negative value in their export-imports balance. Countries that supply energy – Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation and Uzbekistan meanwhile have a more positive export-import dynamics, which is much related to the energy imports, especially with respect to countries whose economy is less reliant on manufacturing.

Figure 7.
Energy and Export/ Import Dynamics



Source: World Bank data

Figure 8.
Migration, Energy-Supply, Remittances and Trade

Country	Personal Remittances Received % of GDP 2014	Energy Imports Net % of Consumption 2013	Ratio of Net Migration/ Population (2007-2012)	Agriculture Value Added % of GDP 2014	Trade Dynamics Exp-Imp % of GDP 2014
Armenia	17.9	72.0	-0.33	21	-20.8
Azerbaijan	2.5	-327.6	-0.19	6	28.1
Belarus	1.6	85.4	1.26	9	4.6
Estonia	2.1	7.2	-0.88	3	1.0
Georgia	12.0	63.4	-7.26	9	-19.6
Kazakhstan	0.1	-107.3	1.03	5	14.6
Kyrgyz Republic	30.3	55.5	-2.16	17	-50.9
Latvia	5.7	50.7	-3.34	3	-4.5
Lithuania	4.4	76.5	-5.25	3	0.9
Moldova	26.2	90.0	-0.27	15	-40.5
Russian Federation	0.4	-83.4	0.78	4	7.3
Tajikistan	43.0	29.8	-1.65	27	-47.5
Turkmenistan	n.a.	-191.4	-0.51	15	28.9
Ukraine	5.6	26.0	0.42	12	-8.7
Uzbekistan	n.a.	-26.1	-0.73	19	-5.2

Source: own calculations based on WB data 2015

The darkest shades in the columns identify countries with the largest shares of remittances of GDP, the most reliant on energy imports (negative figures mean export here), with the largest share of population loss due to migration and agriculture in GDP, and most import-reliant countries (negative figures indicate overwhelming import). The table does not reflect change in economic structure.

Looking at the data one would suggest that Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan perform well as energy suppliers (that is also reflected in the favorable trade balance), however these countries face a negative net migration balance. Moldova gets 90% of its energy consumption from external resources, and heavily depends on remittances: more than a quarter of its GDP is due to remittances. Tajikistan and Kyrgyz Republic are topping the remittances-recipient countries in the world. Latvia and Lithuania are dependent on external energy supply, and are facing significant outward migration. At the other end of the spectrum, most important energy suppliers and sources of remittances in the area are Russia and Kazakhstan as high-income countries of the region. Along with Belarus they are the largest emigration countries. Kazakhstan was the 9th sender of remittances in the world with 3.6 billions USD (in 2014, World Bank data). However, recent economic slowdown has resulted in a decline of remittances from Russia toward the CIS countries.[18] The lowest cost remittances-sending corridor is from Russia to Azerbaijan in the area.

Remittances in these countries are not invested into the local economy (for e.g. entrepreneurship: creating, running, investing in local business), but rather serve as a response to state failure: the lack of provision of adequate social services, health care, or education. Remittances are covering shortage in wages, unemployment allowance, construction of the family's house, or the education of the children. In the Kyrgyz Republic remittances are reported to reduce national poverty rate by 6-7%,[19] while access to decent education and health services improve for the families receiving remittances.[20] Despite that income sent home by migrants contributes to the living conditions of the population, it creates severe dependency for the economy at large, and bears the risk of 'diminishing pressure for reform' to create a better business environment as a moral hazard in the receiving countries[21]. Consumption induced by external income channeled in from often humiliating and difficult working conditions abroad creates the illusion of sustainable growth.[22] Growth can be reached by raising income, thus with further members of the family working abroad. Furthermore, remittances reportedly have social costs in the long run: family disintegration, abandoned children, and brain drain.

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[18] Other sources describe the Russian Federation as a significant recipient of remittances in volume, with 7.9 billions of USD in 2015, and Ukraine with 6.2 were in the top 10 of the world.
[19] MVI 2015
[20] Kireyev 2006
[21] ibid. p. 17
[22] ibid.

Figure 9.
FDI in the post-Soviet countries



(no data on Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan)
Source: World Bank data

Countries of the periphery take their role in the international division of labor by supplying their labor force for seasonal and often informal, low-paid jobs abroad as senders, while the core is represented by its capital with large companies that many times have a significant share of ownership by their home state. Russia is leading in FDI investments with the rest of the countries lagging behind (Figure 9). Russian investment (in CIS and Georgia) comes at first place from energy supply (oil and gas sector 40%), communications and IT (14%), ferrous metals (10%), infrastructure networks (8%) and the financial sector (8%).[23] The leading companies are Gazprom, Lukoil and Vympelkom, which represent 38% of investors, and have their subsidiaries in many republics. The

[23] MVI 2015

other important core player of the area is Kazakhstan present through FDI in transportation 25%, trade of agricultural goods 22%, tourism 18%, and finance 11%.

Countries with negative values are recipients and dependent on FDI. Russian enterprises are overwhelmingly present in Tajikistan with 54%, which we also know as the largest labor-supplier to Russia and Kazakhstan and most dependent on remittances. Russian enterprises are significant in Armenia with 52%, Belarus 47% and Uzbekistan 42%.[24] Countries that are least represented in political alliances of the area, are less tied to Russian investment as well, like Georgia (less than 4%) or Turkmenistan (1%) of the overall FDI.

The share of Russian enterprises is relatively moderate in Kazakhstan, due to mutual investments where 47.6% of mutual FDI renders them leadership in this respect in the area. Russia and Belarus have strong partnership as well (34.5%). A further strong alliance of mutual investments is between Azerbaijan and Georgia.

Ukraine has seen a downturn due to economic and political crisis starting in 2013, when investments from Russia dropped by 8%, from Kazakhstan by 50% and Georgia by 52%. After the eruption of the 2014 events most of the investment projects have been halted and mutual FDI has diminished by 12%.[25]

Projects under the flagship of cooperation are backed by the EuroAsian Development Bank (EADB) mostly in Kazakhshtan (37.7%), then Russia (33.2%), and Belarus (25.6%).[26]

As a conclusion it can be said that Russia is the most important investor in the area, partnering with Belarus and Kazakhstan. The EuroAsian integration project driven mostly by these countries is aiming at deepening the cooperation and economic ties within the area. Due to economic crisis, the eruption of political conflict and war has cut Ukraine off investments. Countries sending their labor force as Tajikistan, Uzbekistan toward Russia and Kazakhstan, are also energy-dependent and largely host enterprises from Russia predominantly in the energy and communications sectors, while Kazakhstan is present through transportation, trade and tourism.

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[24] Data from 2014, UNCTAD 2015 report: A10
[25] MVI 2015
[26] Source: eabr.org/r/about/status

Figure 10.
Foreign Direct Investments

FDI (mrd USD)	Russia	Kazakhstan	Azerbaijan	Ukraine	Belarus	Georgia
Armenia	1.38	x			0.02	
Azerbaijan	3.05	0.01	x		0	
Belarus	8.28	0.03		0.01	x	0.01
Georgia	0.45	0.41	1.35	0.18	0	x
Kazakhstan	9.07	x	0		0.05	
Kyrgyz Republic	0.66	0.67				
Moldova	0.43			0.07	0.02	
Russian Federation	x	2.86	0.06	0.58	0.38	0.03
Tajikistan	1.02	0.07				
Turkmenistan	0.02				0	
Ukraine	9.88	0.1	0.14	x	0.05	0.03
Uzbekistan	3.77	0.08				
Total	38.01	4.23	1.55	0.84	0.52	0.07

Source: EuroAsian Development Bank

6. Division of Labor

To meet the severing competition, (axial) division of labor in the transnational space requires cheap labor employed either in countries with low-wages and low production costs, or pulling in cheap labor force from low-wage countries 'on the spot' of high-wage countries, crowding out local labor force. Transition to market economy in the vulnerable countries of the area has brought about the loss of money transfer for the public sector from the center, collapse of the economy and slowdown in production resulting in a narrowing export base. The case of Tajikistan proves to illustrate that as a consequence of the transition, in a context where no income opportunities are available neither for the population nor for the state, people decide to sell their labor force (as nothing left to offer) abroad to support their household. The nineties have seen a particularly large wave of emigration of all strata, from doctors and teachers to low-skilled workers and young graduates in Tajikistan.[27]

In the post-Soviet area one important trend in labor movement today is the South-North movement toward Russia and Kazakhstan. Sending countries are Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan. Labor migration from Central Asia to Russia and Kazakhstan is a vivid topic in scholarship and policy-making.

[27] Kireyev 2006

According to the official statistics, 53% percent of immigrants from the CIS area residing for 9 months and more in Russia were from Central Asian countries in 2014. This figure fell to 17% due to a wave of emigration flow of Uzbek citizens (resulting in a negative net migration from Uzbekistan), and a steep rise in inflow of Ukrainian citizens (63% of all immigrants from CIS).[28]

These countries show very high poverty-rates, and except for Azerbaijan, tend to have very low productivity. The financial crisis of 2008 has provoked an even larger labor force migration from the countries of periphery. Furthermore, newcomers do not intend to return in many cases (only 3.6% of immigrants from Tajikistan have decided to return home from Russia)[29], as they get employed as soon as they finish their work. As mentioned before, South-North migration corridors between Russia and Central Asia root back to a long history of the times of expansion of the Russian Empire. Later, in the times of Soviet Union labor was supplied for infrastructural development by the countries of the South. Shabashniki, thus moonlighters or overwhelmingly male seasonal workers were recruited and transported in brigades out of the sight of state control. Shabashniki were not paid social benefits, neither overtime payment, or provided accommodation, health etc. services, and were hired illegally by the Soviet managers to meet the planned targets[30].

It is important to note here, that the South-North migration discourse tends to concentrate on the low-skill jobs in the construction industry occupied by Tajik, Uzbek, and Kyrgyz citizens, drawing the picture of the 'migrant from the South', while brain drain is also present. In the case of Tajiks for example, only 50% of remittances originates from these so-called moonlighting construction and agricultural works, 20% work for enterprises in other sectors, and 30% are shuttle traders, while the average migrant shows a higher level of education than the remaining population.[31]

In the first half of the nineties movement was related overwhelmingly to forced migration, repatriation and trade. After crisis reared its head in late 1997 and erupted in 1998 sweeping along the area, labor force of the Post-Soviet countries entered more explicitly the global labor market. Sending countries were overwhelmingly Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia toward destination countries as Greece, Turkey, Portugal, Italy, US, Canada.

Trade liberalization has induced East-West migration right before and after the transition. Many were trading with goods brought from Western Europe and sold in the East, especially from the European border countries: Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. Groups of traders remained in the destination countries establishing channels of trade. Seasonal workers joined especially from Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine.

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[28] Source: RF Federal State Statistics Service
[29] Golovnin 2012, p. 115
[30] Zemtsov 2001 [1991], p. 332
[31] Data 2003: Kireyev 2006

Early 2000s have brought a stricter Russian policy that has resulted in diminishing migration statistics and expansion of illegal migration,[32] illegal stay and employment in the informal sector. Since then migration policy has been revised many times to loosen the regulation both for seasonal migration, and for attracting human capital, thus highly qualified professionals.

7. Gender and Migration: Toward Feminization

Illegal migration and informal employment cut wages, allowing for more capital accumulation, and a rising competitiveness of production costs. Inequalities rose, as with lower wages, less remittance were sent back to the families, creating a further push for them to step into the arena of the global labor market.

Working abroad has become a survival strategy due to difficulties stemming from uneven development path inherited from the Soviet Union, the political, economic crises faced after the transition, civil wars, and unfavorable economic structure of the sending countries. Many have fled from Georgia due to war (1992-94, 2008), and about 1/3 of the population lives under the poverty line since decades. Workers from Georgia, mostly men in the construction industry, seasonal agricultural work, and services did not require any visa before 2000 in Russia. The restrictions have pushed workers towards the informal economy. Moreover the war with Russia in 2008 has brought about political and economic tensions. Labor migration has shifted towards the Middle-East, Europe and North-America, along with the feminization of migration. Gender imbalance was present due to civil war (1992-1997) in Tajikistan, where the notion of 'missing men' also covers men who work abroad.[33] Social change endured by gender imbalance implies more burden on the wives on one hand, men starting a new life abroad results in either polygamy or divorce, where wives are reported to be left with poor legal protection or without rights to property or childcare allowance on the other.[34]

Women became more and more important in world labor migration and in the post-Soviet region as well. The feminization of migration is related to unbalanced social status of women along with economic difficulties. Women, very often married with children, as a pattern leave for a temporal work leading to a permanent stay in the destination country, sending back remittances to the remaining family and relatives for living. In some societies women are less accepted to have jobs other than the household. Missing men, that get separated or divorced from their wives back home, might leave women without appropriate childcare payment or financial support, that is a push factor toward labor migration. In Europe and Central-Asia women represent 51.8% of immigrants

[32] Molodikova 2007
[33] Malyuchenko 2015
[34] Malyuchenko 2015

compared to the 47.4% of the world.[35] A large share of women gets a job as domestic worker, or in a hotel, social services or healthcare.

The axis of division of labor here falls on gender and geography. Immigrant men from Georgia tended to work in CIS countries, especially in Russia (for seasonal work, see above). New destination with a larger share of women moving toward Turkey and the EU emerged in the two-thousands.[36] Women with higher qualification reportedly preferred working in the EU and Turkey rather than in Russia or in other CIS countries.[37]

Women from Eastern-Europe and Central-Asia compete on the global labor market with immigrants from Africa, South-America, and the Far-East. Immigrant women in low-paid jobs, like domestic work are usually either highly qualified and unable to find jobs in their domain, or very low-skilled. Russian-speaking networks, and agencies help immigrants of the CIS in job-search.[38]

Italy is still a popular target country for immigrants from Moldova and Ukraine. 50% of immigrants from Moldova moving toward the West have chosen Italy, and 20% of Ukrainian immigrants. From Armenia it was 52% women migrating toward the West, mostly to Belgium, France, Germany and Poland.[39]

A further consequence of the above trends is the emerging number of abandoned children whose parents work abroad. These children are raised by the elderly or looked after by relatives or neighbors, they are prone to be neglected, or drop out of school due to reported problems related to family disintegration.[40]

8. Conclusions

Division of labor and resources across the former Soviet countries is shaped by the heritage of dependency structures rooting back to centuries of expansion of the Russian Empire and the centralized allocation of production within the planning economy of the Soviet Union. The transition affected all the countries of the area, inducing movement of people for citizenship, labor, trade, or peace. Most vulnerable countries proved to be those, whose economy relied on agriculture, or showed traits of energy-dependence. Countries that lacked natural resources or the potential to transform their economies to productive ones supply their labor force as a survival strategy, creating remittances-dependence. Share of GDP reliant on remittances is topped by Tajikistan (42%) followed

[35] OECD Migration Factbook. p.201
[36] Hofmann, Buckley 2013
[37] ibidem
[38] Gavanas 2013
[39] In 2014, OECD 2016
[40] Malyuchenko 2015: referring on Impact of Labor Migration on “Children Left Behind” in Tajikistan (Dushanbe: UNICEF, November 2011).

by Kyrgyz Republic (30%), Moldova (26%), Armenia (17.9%), and Georgia (12%). The latter three countries send their labor force predominantly outside the FSU area.

Within the interstate system of the CIS Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus pull labor force, while invest through mutual FDI into the countries of the area. Belarus is tied to Russia predominantly for its energy supply, and market for its own goods. These three countries form a custom union. Russia benefits from the presence of its enterprises in many states of the area, especially in the energy and telecommunications sector. Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan were the drivers behind most of the political integration processes in the area. However, by the mid-2000s, disintegration has also taken place due to rivalry configurations. Azerbaijan, Georgia and later Uzbekistan have left the CIS and the Bishkek Treaty. Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation and Tajikistan form the Eurasian Economic Cooperation since 2000. To put forth the cooperation the above countries have established the EuroAsian Development Bank in 2006. EADB invests into mutual infrastructure development projects, where Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus play the major role as core-countries. A rival formation, the GUAM, lead by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova competes with the Russian integration policy, where the borders of the rival configurations are less permeable.

Meanwhile countries of periphery sending their labor force face severe challenges in their society. Women have also taken a more active role in working abroad in the past decade. While men are more pictured to move in the fSU for seasonal, temporary work in the agriculture, construction industry or trade, women tend to leave and find work in the West in domestic work, healthcare and social services. Abandoned children represent a social problem in many sending countries from Moldova and Ukraine to Tajikistan. Despite the positive effects of remittances on reducing poverty, and addressing problems stemming from economic instability, long-term dependence of a state on remittances creates a non-sustainable path, with missing incentives for structural reforms, and raising inequalities between countries as a consequence.

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